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USE AND DISPOSITION OF LIFE INSURANCE IN DISSOLUTION OF 
MARRIAGE 
Jani Maurer1 
When a couple seeks to dissolve their marriage, life insurance warrants          
attention.  Existing life insurance policies with a cash value and term insurance, 
including employer provided group term insurance, should be addressed.  At times, 
it may be advantageous for one or both parties to be required or allowed to        
purchase new policies on each others’ lives as explained further below. 
First, purchase of life insurance or continuation of existing polices by one or 
both parties incident to the dissolution of marriage may be useful to assure      
payment of support to a spouse, and/or to the dependent children of the parties.  
Second, one or both spouses may already own life insurance on their own lives or 
the lives of others.  If these polices have cash value, they constitute property to be 
accounted for and divided in the dissolution of marriage proceeding.  Third, one or 
both spouses may be settlors of irrevocable trusts created prior to the dissolution of 
marriage.  If these trusts own life insurance policies insuring the lives of one or 
both spouses, or if the spouses are named present or future trustees or beneficiaries 
of these trusts, action may be warranted in connection with the dissolution of    
marriage to terminate the rights of a party in respect to the trusts.  If one spouse is 
nominated a present or future trustee, or is a beneficiary of a trust owning life   
insurance, and the trust was created by a member of the other spouse’s family, it 
may not be desirable for the spouse nominated to serve as trustee or to continue to 
be a beneficiary of the trust. Such circumstances would necessitate further action in 
the dissolution of marriage proceeding.  Fourth, disputes may arise upon the death 
of an insured former spouse following dissolution of marriage regarding who is 
entitled to life insurance proceeds.  At least one Florida judge complained about the 
lack of guidance from the legislature on when and how to address life insurance in 
a dissolution of marriage case.2 Another noteworthy issue is when benefits are  
 ________________________  
 1. Jani E. Maurer is a professor at the Shepard Broad Law Center at Nova Southeastern University. This 
Article was inspired by the inquisitive minds of her students. 
 2. In his concurring opinion in Kearley v. Kearley, 745 So. 2d 987, 989 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), 
acting Chief Judge Altenbernd stated:  This case presents a good example of the confusion created by Florida’s ill-
defined approaches to life insurance in divorce proceedings.  Trial courts can approach life insurance from at least 
three different perspectives.  First, the cash surrender value of life insurance purchased during the marriage can be 
treated as a marital asset without restricting the owner’s future ability to select beneficiaries. Second, by        
compelling the policy owner to select the former spouse as beneficiary, the trial court can use the policy as    
security to indemnify the former spouse for any unpaid obligations arising from the final judgment, typically for 
alimony or child support due at the time the payor spouse dies.  Third, the trial court can compel the owner to 
select the former spouse as beneficiary in order to minimize future economic harm to the surviving family upon 
the untimely death of a spouse who paid alimony or child support during his or her life.  Chapter 61 does not give 
trial judges any meaningful guidance concerning when or how to use these approaches. 
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unintentionally paid to former spouses when life insurance beneficiary designation 
are not changed or completed by persons after a divorce.3  This article explores the 
foregoing life insurance considerations in Florida dissolution of marriage          
proceedings, reviews current applicable law, and suggests methods of effectively 
dealing with life insurance in the divorce context. 
I. LIFE INSURANCE TO PROTECT CHILD SUPPORT 
Many cases addressing use of life insurance to secure child support involve a 
custodial parent also claiming that life insurance is required to assure payment of 
alimony.  This section of the article focuses on cases and law specifically          
applicable only to child support.  Cases addressing use of life insurance to secure 
both alimony and child support4 are covered in the next section of this article.5 
The court is authorized to direct a parent of a minor child to obtain and     
maintain life insurance on his or her life to the extent insurance is necessary to  
assure that child support will be paid.6  This authority existed under common law 
prior to enactment of Fla. Stat. § 61.13(c).7  A need for the maintenance of a life 
  
Cases decided since 1999 have perhaps clarified the options available and when each might be effectively     
employed.  This article reviews the options suggested by Judge Altenbernd to ascertain the extent to which they 
are viable today, and considers situations not mentioned in the context of Kearley. Id. 
 3. See generally Suzanne Soliman, A Fair Presumption: Why Florida Needs a Divorce Revocation Statute 
for Beneficiary-Designated Nonprobate Assets, 36 STETSON L. REV. 397 (2007) [hereinafter A Fair Presumption]. 
 4. One policy may be used to secure both payment of child support and alimony.  See Haydu v. Haydu, 
591 So. 2d 655, 656 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (the husband’s obligation to provide medical and dental     
insurance for both his former wife and minor child was secured by several life insurance policies on which the 
former wife and minor child were to be named beneficiaries); Terry v. Terry, 788 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2001) (a final judgment of dissolution expressly authorized the husband to secure payment of alimony 
and child support either with two $250,000.00 life insurance policies or one $500,000.00 life insurance policy); 
Hauser v. Hauser, 644 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (father ordered to maintain existing life 
insurance policy to secure both permanent alimony and child support); Lorman v. Lorman, 633 So. 2d 106, 108 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (trial court properly incorporated agreement that the former husband would maintain 
$325,000.00 life insurance policy as security for his alimony and child support obligation in judgment, but    
improperly ordered additional $250,000.00 life insurance requirement); see also Smith v. Smith, 912 So. 2d 702, 
704 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (trial court ordered a husband to maintain a $300,000.00 life insurance policy he 
already owned, naming his wife beneficiary of $100,000.00 of policy proceeds and his minor children            
beneficiaries of the remaining proceeds. The trial court’s decision was reversed on other grounds). 
 5. Similar rules apply to determining when it is appropriate to require life insurance to secure child   
support and alimony.  Thus, the next section of this article may be instructive even when one is contemplating use 
of life insurance only to secure child support. 
 6. Fla. Stat. § 61.13(c) (1990); Cantrell v. Home Life Ins. Co., 524 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 1988) (Court can order insurance be maintained to secure a court ordered support obligation); Jaworski v. 
Jaworski, 972 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (The court has discretion to require maintenance of life 
insurance to secure payment only where need is demonstrated); Haydu, 591 So. 2d at 656 (Child support includes 
payments to the custodial parent, as well as other payments for the minor child’s benefit.  A parent’s obligation to 
pay for medical and dental insurance for a minor child may be secured by life insurance); see Bosem v. Bosem, 
279 So. 2d 863, 865-66 (Fla. 1973) (The right of a court to require a parent to provide life insurance as security for 
child support payments was recognized in Florida long before enactment of the present statute); see also Riley v. 
Riley, 131 So. 2d 491, 493 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (discussing courts discretion to order father to maintain 
insurance as security for child support obligations).  While this article is limited to use of life insurance in divorce 
cases, a court in a paternity suit may order a parent of a child born out of wedlock to provide life insurance to 
secure child support under the same standard applicable in divorce cases.  See Gazaleh v. Reeves, 940 So. 2d 1200 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006); see also Guerin v. DiRoma, 819 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (where 
the court considered imposition of a life insurance requirement in the context of a paternity suit). 
 7. See Waskin v. Waskin, 346 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977). 
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insurance policy requires a showing of special circumstances,8 or appropriate    
circumstances.9  The spouse seeking imposition of a requirement that a payor    
obligated to remit child support obtain or keep life insurance in effect to assure 
future payment has the burden of proving that a need or appropriate circumstances 
exist.10  In addition, before ordering maintenance of life insurance, the recipient 
spouse must prove and the trial court must determine the amount of insurance   
required, the cost and availability of the insurance, and the payor parent’s ability to 
pay for the insurance.11  Availability of the life insurance focuses on whether the 
parent obligated to pay child support is insurable,12 or whether an insurance policy 
already exists on the payor’s life.  Availability of insurance is particularly         
important where the payor suffers from a past or present medical condition.      
Finally, before ordering purchase or maintenance of life insurance to secure child 
support, the trial court is required to consider the financial impact of paying      
insurance premiums on the obligor.13  The premiums paid, where life insurance is 
properly required, constitute additional child support.14  The amount of insurance 
required “must be related to the extent of the obligation being secured.”15  Failure 
of the party seeking security to offer competent evidence to meet the burden of 
proof cannot result in a valid order requiring insurance.16 It is the trial court’s duty 
 ________________________  
 8. This test is supported by ample authority.  Crozier v. Crozier, 819 So. 2d 834, 837 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2002); Pinion v. Pinion, 818 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Baker v. Baker, 763 So. 2d 493, 494-
95 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000); McDaniel v. McDaniel, 653 So. 2d 1076, 1078 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 477 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 9. This test originated in Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1153, 1154-55 (Fla. 1989); see also Layeni 
v. Layeni, 843 So. 2d 295, 300 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Richardson v. Richardson, 722 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 10. Longo v. Longo, 533 So. 2d 791, 795 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (where no need for security is 
established, and the cost and amount of insurance are not determined, even though there is an existing life     
insurance policy and proof of payor’s ability to pay premiums, it is reversible error to require life insurance as 
security); Israel v. Israel, 824 So. 2d 953, 953-54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Mitchell, 477 So. 2d at 3 (where 
the father of the minor child was a physician, expected to continue to earn a substantial income, absent other facts 
the mother failed to prove a need to require the father to maintain life insurance to secure child support); Frechter 
v. Frechter, 548 So. 2d 712, 714 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (where the father is young and expected to continue 
to earn a living adequate to pay child support, special circumstances are not established). 
 11. Byers v. Byers, 910 So. 2d 336, 346 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005); see also Burnham v. Burnham, 884 
So. 2d 390, 393 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (where the court recognized that it could not in a divorce case   
compel a parent to pay child support after the parent’s death absent the parent’s consent. The trial court had   
erroneously required the payor spouse to leave a monetary gift in his will for the child to continue child support 
payments after payor’s death). 
 12. Byers, 910 So. 2d at 346; but see Scalabroni v. Scalabroni, 807 So. 2d 793, 794 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2002) (where the parent already owns life insurance to be used to secure payment of child support, evidence that 
the parent is insurable may not be needed). 
 13. Burnham, 884 So. 2d at 392; see Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2004); Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So. 2d 1023, 1033 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding a trial court’s finding that 
the cost of insurance “was not prohibitive” without more, is inadequate). 
 14. See Guerin, 819 So. 2d at 970. 
 15. Burnham v. Burnham, 884 So. 2d 390, 392 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004); See Smith, 912 So. 2d at 705. 
 16. Lopez v. Lopez, 780 So. 2d 164, 165-66 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (where order requiring life  
insurance reversed because the record was devoid of evidence that the payor was insurable, the cost of insurance, 
or the payor’s ability to afford the insurance); see also Knight v. Knight, 746 So. 2d 1117, 1120 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000) (where the father, who was age 50 and had already had both heart and back surgery, could obtain 
affordable life insurance, it was reversible error to require life insurance to be purchased to secure child support 
without evidence that a policy existed or could be obtained or the cost of insurance); see generally Guerin, 819 So. 
2d  at 968 (stating a trial court order requiring the father of a child to provide life insurance to secure child support 
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to determine whether or not there is a need for the policy, the amount the policy 
should be issued for, the costs incurred in the maintenance of the policy, that the 
issuance of a policy is attainable, and that the anticipated payor is financially able 
to maintain the policy. Failure to do so is reversible error.17 
A final judgment requiring maintenance of life insurance to secure child     
support should clearly reflect when the obligation ends, and name the child (or the 
child’s representative) as beneficiary of the life insurance policy.18  The judgment 
should expressly state that “the insurance is to serve as security only to the extent 
of prospective child support” owed in the event of the payor parent’s death if that is 
the case.19  The amount of insurance required should be stated in the court’s      
order.20  Where existing insurance, including insurance provided by the payor   
parent’s employer, is adequate and is to provide security, that should likewise be 
stated in the court’s order.21  If employer provided insurance is to provide security, 
additional terms should be set forth specifying what is to occur if the employer 
decreases the amount of insurance provided or ceases offering life insurance, or if 
the payor parent’s employment terminates. 
The trial court is generally required to include specific findings in its judgment 
requiring life insurance to secure child support for two reasons.  First, the findings 
are warranted to support the conclusion that the insurance is necessary and required 
under the statute.22  Second, the findings are required to provide a sufficient record 
for appellate review.23  Where the trial court neglects to make the requisite       
findings, but the evidence in the record nevertheless supports its conclusion, any 
error may be harmless.24  For example, in one case a trial court ordered the husband 
to maintain a life insurance policy paying $100,000.00 in death benefits to secure 
  
in a paternity case was overturned on appeal, due to lack of evidence that the father was insurable, the cost of the 
insurance, or that the father could afford the premiums). 
 17. Byers, 910 So. 2d at 336, 346; see also Arthur v. Arthur, 987 So. 2d 212, 215 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2008) (finding that the husband obligated to pay child support maintain $50,000.00 in life insurance to secure this 
obligation was reversible error, absent evidence as to the cost and availability of the insurance); Burnham, 884 So. 
2d at 392; Cissel v. Cissel, 845 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Layeni, 843 So. 2d  at 300; Scalabroni, 
807 So. 2d at 794 (the court held that it was reversible error to require a father to reinstate one life insurance policy 
to secure payment of child support without first finding the father was insurable, and determining the cost of 
insurance and the father’s ability to pay).  Similarly, a trial court’s requirement that the payor maintain life    
insurance to secure child support without a finding of the amount of insurance required, if the payor’s employer 
provided insurance was adequate, or if it was not adequate that the payor could afford the insurance was reversed. 
Parks v. Parks, 637 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
 18. Haydu, 591 So. 2d at 657  (minor children were to be named beneficiaries of the life insurance, but the 
final judgment neglected to state that they could be removed as beneficiaries as they attained the age of majority). 
 19. Trager v. Trager, 541 So. 2d 148, 148 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); see also Lithgow v. Lithgow, 340 
So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (where a husband was required to keep an existing term insurance policy 
in effect to secure child support, but the final judgment was modified to reflect that the policy was only as security 
if the father died and need only be maintained until the child attained the age of majority). 
 20. Parks, 637 So. 2d at 50-51. 
 21. Id. at 50-51 (it was reversible error for the court to order the former husband to provide life insurance 
to secure payment of child support, without specifying the amount of insurance or whether the husband’s employer 
provided insurance was sufficient). 
 22. Winney v. Winney, 979 So. 2d 396, 400 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.; see also Scalabroni, 807 So. 2d at 794 (where the court order requiring a father to continue to 
maintain a policy he already owned to secure payment of child support was not reversible error due to lack of an 
express finding that he was insurable, as the record reflected the existence of a policy and the cost of insurance). 
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child support, without ascertaining the cost of insurance or that the husband was 
insurable or could afford the premiums.25 The evidence reflected that the           
husband’s employer provided $97,400.00 of group term insurance on the husband’s 
life at no cost to the husband, and the husband already had in effect an additional 
$146,000.00 in life insurance at a cost of $5.39 per month.  There was adequate 
evidence in the record that the insurance was available and affordable.26  Thus, the 
trial court’s error was harmless.27  Because adequate insurance already existed to 
secure payment of child support, there was no need for the court to find that the 
husband remained insurable. 
A request that life insurance be provided to secure payment of child support 
must be properly pled or tried by consent of the parties.28  Where there is neither 
pleading nor consent, the trial court lacks authority to require a parent to provide 
life insurance for this purpose.29  When an issue is properly raised by the pleadings 
about whether life insurance should be required, the trial court is obligated to make 
relevant findings.30 
As noted previously, special circumstances must be established to warrant    
security.  Special circumstances may exist in a variety of situations.  For example, 
special circumstances requiring security may exist when the payor indicates he 
may not continue to practice his prior profession.31 In contrast, special               
circumstances were not found to exist where the parent paying child support was 
young, healthy, engaged in a lucrative medical practice, and no evidence of prior 
nonpayment existed.32 
Because the obligation to pay child support generally terminates with the death 
of the payor parent,33 when life insurance is mandated by the court to assure    
payment the proceeds of the life insurance are only payable for this purpose to the 
extent that child support is owed at the time of the payor parent’s (the insured’s) 
death.34  Life insurance is not to be required by a court in a divorce to force a    
deceased parent to provide an estate or windfall for the child.35  Nor is it generally 
 ________________________  
 25. Winney, 979 So. 2d at 399. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Williamitis v. Williamitis, 741 So. 2d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Duffey v. Duffey, 972 So. 2d 290, 292 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (where wife properly pled her 
request that the court require the husband to provide life insurance to secure his payments of both alimony and 
child support, the trial court’s failure to make any findings or to address the issue was reversible error requiring 
remand). 
 31. Carbonell v. Carbonell, 618 So. 2d 326, 327 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (where the payor father 
stated that he might cease practicing law). 
 32. Waskin, 346 So. 2d at 1063 (this case was decided before enactment of Fla. Stat. § 61.13(c)). 
 33. Privett v. Privett, 535 So. 2d 663, 665 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); see also Riley, 131 So. 2d at 492 
(where this long standing rule was both recognized and criticized). 
 34. Longo, 533 So. 2d at 795; see also Hauser, 644 So. 2d at 555 (to the extent that the court’s order could 
be interpreted to require the insured father to support children after they attained age 18 or were otherwise capable 
of self-support, the order constituted reversible error. Special needs children were involved in that case). 
 35. Eberly v. Eberly, 344 So. 2d 886, 888 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); see also Trager, 541 So. 2d at 149 
(where the court explained that, absent a parent’s express agreement, a parent may not be forced to maintain life 
insurance for the absolute benefit of a child, other than where statute authorizes life insurance as security for child 
support owed and not yet paid). 
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proper for a court to require a parent to maintain life insurance for an adult child 
who is not a dependent.36  However, courts have recognized the need for child  
support to continue if the payor dies,37 and have allowed collection from life     
insurance proceeds of child support which would have been payable had payor not 
died, in excess of that owed as of the date of the payor’s death.38  While there is 
some judicial support expressed for allowing life insurance to support a minor child 
after the death of the payor parent, a question remains about whether the law     
actually authorizes such application of life insurance proceeds when the life      
insurance is maintained solely due to court order.39  Courts have stated that:  
[A] final judgment requiring the security of life insurance must 
specify whether the insurance is security for unpaid support       
obligations, in which case only a portion of the proceeds might be 
encumbered, or whether all the insurance proceeds are to be      
distributed to the beneficiaries upon the spouse’s death to          
minimize economic harm to the family.40 
This language may reflect the authority of the court to order maintenance of 
life insurance and payment of policy proceeds in excess of child support arrearages 
owed at death. 
Courts recognize that a parent may, in a marital settlement agreement,          
voluntarily commit to purchase and maintain life insurance for the benefit of minor 
or adult children, and that such provisions are enforceable.41  By entering the 
agreement, the insured parent voluntarily deprives himself of any future right to 
designate a different beneficiary.42  In a marital settlement agreement a former 
spouse may voluntarily bind himself or herself to provide life insurance proceeds 
for a child in excess of the amount of child support owed at the payor’s death. 
In light of the limited purpose of court mandated life insurance, attention is 
warranted to the amount of insurance required.  The insurance required by a court 
to be maintained should not exceed the child support owed.43  Requiring the non-
 ________________________  
 36. Merkin v. Merkin, 804 So. 2d 595, 598 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
 37. See Carbonell, 618 So. 2d at 327. 
 38. See Browning v. Browning, 784 So. 2d 1145, 1149 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Roxy v. Roxy, 454 
So. 2d 84, 84-85 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
 39. See Kearley, 745 So. 2d at 990 (Altenbernd, J., concurring). 
 40. Smith, 912 So. 2d at 705.  Smith involved a contested divorce where the couple did not enter a marital 
settlement agreement.  The trial court’s order that the husband maintain an existing life insurance policy to secure 
payment of child support and alimony was reversed due to absence of requisite factual findings. 
 41. Cantrell, 524 So. 2d at 1064 (stating “a parent or spouse can voluntarily agree to name and maintain 
another person, including a support beneficiary, as an insured under a life insurance policy.  Such an agreement 
need not be limited to security for a support obligation and can constitute a binding and unconditional conveyance 
of the benefits payable under such policy”). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Higgins v. Higgins, 348 So. 2d 48, 48-49 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (trial court erroneously 
required the father to maintain a $75,000.00 life insurance policy on his life, in addition to a $15,000.00 life  
insurance policy which was alone adequate to pay any child support owed on his death, where total child support 
owed by the husband until the child attained age 18 was $12,000.00); see also Hedendal v. Hedendal, 695 So. 2d 
391, 392 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (where the $1,000,000.00 of life insurance the husband was initially   
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custodial parent to provide life insurance to secure child support payments in a sum 
more than twice the child support due until the minor attains the age of majority is 
excessive.44  Where a parent’s total support obligation until the minor children 
reached age 18 was less than $325,000.00, it was reversible error for a court to 
require the payor to maintain a $1,000.000.00 life insurance policy on his life.45  
However, the fact that the amount of life insurance exceeds the balance of child 
support owed until the child attains the age of majority is not necessarily reversible 
error.46  Even if a parent agrees to be responsible for payments in excess of child 
support, such as costs of college tuition, the life insurance mandated by a court 
should not exceed the amount of his potential liability.47  The court is required to 
specify in its order the amount of insurance needed to secure payment of child  
support.48 
In most Florida cases reported, the parent with custody of the minor child seeks 
to require the other parent to provide life insurance.  Absent a custodial parent’s 
express agreement to the contrary, it is improper to require the custodial parent to 
provide life insurance to secure the custodial parent’s support obligation.49  This is 
particularly true where the custodial parent is solely liable for support of the child, 
has not defaulted in that obligation, and is retired, healthy and not engaged in a 
dangerous activity.50 
A judgment, order or marital settlement agreement incorporated therein       
imposing a life insurance requirement to secure child support payments should be 
detailed, clear and comprehensive.  The judgment or marital settlement agreement 
should expressly state that the insurance is required to protect child support,51 to 
avoid later assertions that it had a different purpose. The exact amount of          
  
ordered to maintain to secure child support was reduced to reflect the lesser amount of child support potentially 
owed). 
 44. Lakin v. Lakin, 901 So. 2d 186, 189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005); see also Walla v. Thomas, 805 So. 
2d 1041 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
 45. Walia, 805 So. 2d at 1042. 
 46. Bissell v. Bissell, 622 So. 2d 532, 534-35 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (court required husband to 
maintain a $25,000.00 life insurance policy even though the husband’s total child support for the three years until 
the child would be age 18 was $16,380.00).  Perhaps because the father also had responsibilities to pay for medical 
care costs for the child in excess of those covered by insurance, the court held the amount of life insurance not 
sufficiently unreasonable to constitute an abuse of discretion or reversible error. 
 47. Pyle v. Pyle, 375 So. 2d 1088, 1089 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (court held it was reversible error to 
require a father to maintain $302,000.00 in life insurance for his children, when the present value of the insurance 
was three times the amount of his obligation). 
 48. Parks, 637 So. 2d at 50-51. 
 49. Simon v. Simon, 319 So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); see Shiveley v. Shiveley, 635 So. 2d 
1021 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (where on appeal both former spouses agreed it was reversible error for the 
trial court to require the custodial parent to provide life insurance to secure her child support obligation); see also 
Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988, 989 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) accord Eberly, 344 So. 2d at 888. 
 50. Simon, 319 So. 2d at 47. 
 51. See, e.g., Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639, 642-43 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (where divorcing 
spouses entered a marital settlement agreement requiring the husband to continue to maintain a $10,000.00 life 
insurance policy, on which his wife was to remain primary beneficiary and their children were to remain alternate 
beneficiaries.  After entry of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage based on the agreement, the former  
husband unsuccessfully sought modification to require the former wife to hold policy proceeds in trust for the 
minor children.  Neither the agreement nor the final judgment stated that the life insurance policy was to secure 
payment of child support.  As the policy rights of the wife were instead found to be part of the distribution of 
marital assets, the former husband’s request was denied.)  
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insurance to be maintained should be stated, along with when the insurance may be 
decreased or other beneficiaries may be named as the children age. The             
incremental decreasing amount of remaining unpaid child support obligation 
should also be stated.52 If the insurance is required in a marital settlement     
agreement to assure payment of child support, the agreement and final judgment 
should so state to avoid future disputes about the purpose.53  If the insurance is to 
secure payment of support owed for several children the effect on policy proceeds 
as each child attains age of majority should be set forth.54  The judgment should 
expressly specify that the obligation to maintain the insurance or to name the child 
a beneficiary terminates as the child attains age 18 and all child support due is paid. 
This will assure the life insurance is only provided as security.55  The custodial 
parent should seek a provision in the judgment, or insert a provision in an     
agreement requiring life insurance, to enable the custodial parent to verify and  
receive proof that the policy remains in effect,56 as well as to receive notice of any 
policy cancellation. Appropriate provisions preventing the insured owner from 
pledging, encumbering, assigning, transferring or borrowing from the policy are 
also advisable.57 
In many cases, where one parent was required to maintain life insurance to   
secure child support, the minor child or children were named beneficiaries of the 
policy.58  Reversible error was found where the court ordered the custodial spouse 
 ________________________  
 52. An example of such wording is found in Liss v. Liss, 937 So. 2d 760, 762 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2006).  The agreement provided: 
The Husband shall maintain, at his sole expense, a life insurance policy providing death 
benefits to the Wife of $500,000.00 so long as he shall be obligated to pay either alimony 
and/or child support.  To the extent that the Husband’s obligation to pay alimony and/or 
child support falls below $500,000.00, then he shall have the right to reduce the available 
coverage to the extent necessary to fully insure the remaining payments of alimony and/or 
child support.  Further, if the Husband chooses not to reduce the death benefit, he may     
designate any beneficiary he so chooses for the excess.  In determining what is necessary, 
the procedure will be to determine what amount of lump sum (at an interest rate of 6%) will 
be [needed] to amortize the outstanding balance. 
 53. Cantrell presents an example of such a dispute.  In a marital settlement agreement a husband promised 
to name his children beneficiaries of his life insurance policies.  Ignoring the agreement, the former husband 
named his second spouse policy beneficiary.  Because the agreement did not expressly state that it was to secure 
child support and no child support was owed on the husband’s death, the court held the children were third party    
beneficiaries of the agreement between their parents.  Thus, the children, rather than decedent’s widow, were 
entitled to the policy proceeds. 524 So. 2d at 1063. 
 54. Eberly, 344 So. 2d at 888 (where insurance was required to assure payment of child support for six 
minor children named as beneficiaries, the court order was deficient for failing to state what happened to a child’s 
share of policy proceeds when the child attained age of majority). 
 55. See Eberly, 344 So. 2d at 888; see also Kirkwood v. Kirkwood, 365 So. 2d 793, 794 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1978) (where the wording of the trial court judgment was revised to reflect that the insurance requirement 
ended when the minor child attained the age of majority). 
 56. See, e.g., Terry, 788 So. 2d at 1130 (stating the judgment required the husband to “provide wife with all 
reasonable and necessary documentation, on an annual basis, so that she can verify that the life insurance coverage 
exists and remains effective . . .”). 
 57. See Terry, 788 So. 2d at 1130 (for an example of such a provision). 
 58. See, e.g., Browning, 784 So. 2d at 1145; Haydu, 591 So. 2d at 655; Brahmer v. Brahmer, 596 So. 2d 
517 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Tassone v. Tassone, 492 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Eberly, 344 
So. 2d at 886; Lithgow, 340 So. 2d at 1283, 1288; Riley v. Riley, 131 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961); see 
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to be named beneficiary of the policy securing child support, whether the          
beneficiary designation was revocable59 or irrevocable.60  The wisdom of naming a 
minor a policy beneficiary, and thus causing the need for a costly court            
guardianship proceeding if the insured parent dies while the child is a minor, is 
questionable.  This is particularly true where there are several minor children, each 
of whom would require a separate guardianship proceeding.  One alternative to 
avoid the costs of guardianship is to name a trustee the policy beneficiary,61 and 
possibly the policy owner.  A trust agreement would bind the trustee and specify 
how insurance proceeds are to be expended for the support of the minor child.  A 
trust agreement could also provide flexibility, allowing the insured parent to     
dispose of insurance proceeds not needed to satisfy child support owed at the    
insured’s death as the parent wished.  Another alternative might be to establish a 
Uniform Transfers To Minors Act account62 for the minor child, and to name the 
custodian of the account the beneficiary of the life insurance policy.  When the 
child attains the age of majority, the insured parent may change the policy         
beneficiary. 
Use of a trust also addresses another possible concern, namely who should own 
the life insurance policy.  The insured may wish to own it, particularly if he or she 
is paying the premiums and desires to retain the right to change the beneficiary 
once the child support obligation ends.  The custodial parent of the minor child 
may wish to own the policy, to assure that beneficiaries are not prematurely 
changed and to assure that he or she is notified if premiums are not paid, the     
insurance is cancelled, or any other adverse changes occur. There is no              
requirement in the law mandating either that the payor or the former spouse      
receiving child support own the policy.  Nor does the law authorize the former 
spouse receiving child support to be the policy beneficiary.  It is permissible for the 
payor to create a trust, naming an independent trustee to own the insurance and/or 
to be the policy beneficiary.63 
  
also Cissel, 845 So. 2d at 993 (where the court ordered that the minor child be named primary beneficiary on the 
life insurance policy). 
 59. Parker v. Parker, 665 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Tassone, 492 So. 2d at 1086. 
 60. Alpha, 885 So. 2d at 1034; but see Hauser, 644 So. 2d at 554.  In Layeni, 843 So. 2d at 300, the court 
stated that the custodial parent should not be the named beneficiary of life insurance ordered to assure payment of 
child support, because she lacks a protectable interest.  However, an agreement between the parents may result in 
the custodial parent being both the owner and the beneficiary of the life insurance.  Robbins v. Jackson Nat’l Life 
Ins. Co., 802 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).  In Robbins, the father was ordered to pay child support 
secured by life insurance.  A dispute arose when he failed to do so.  After mediation an agreement was reached, 
under which the mother became owner of two life insurance policies insuring the father.  Although the mother paid 
the insurance premiums, the case arose when the father attempted to interfere with the policies. 
 61. Turner v. Turner, 507 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (a former husband was required to 
maintain $200,000.00 in life insurance on his life).  In part, the insurance was to assure payment of child support.  
Both the marital settlement agreement and the final judgment of dissolution were silent about the beneficiary of 
the policy.  The former husband created a trust, named the trust beneficiary of the policy, and required the trustee 
to first use any insurance proceeds to satisfy alimony and child support obligations. 
 62. Fla. Stat. § 710. (2010). 
 63. See Parker, 655 So. 2d at 234, in which a husband was ordered to pay child support and to secure the 
payments with life insurance.  The court permitted him to establish a trust, and to name the trustee beneficiary of 
the policy proceeds on his death.  The former wife was not designated the trustee.  The terms of the trust required 
payments to the parties’ child. 
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Potential advantages exist to using a trust to own and/or be the beneficiary of 
the life insurance in the context of a divorce, in addition to avoiding the need for 
court guardianship proceedings.  First, a payor may have greater ability to assure 
that, if he or she dies, the trustee uses the life insurance to pay only required child 
support and any excess life insurance proceeds benefit others selected by the payor.  
Second, if the payor is a wealthy individual with an estate subject to estate taxes, 
the use of an irrevocable trust to own and be the beneficiary of the life insurance 
may allow the proceeds to escape estate taxation on the insured’s death.  Third, a 
trustee owes fiduciary obligations to adhere to the terms of the trust.  If a third  
party rather than one of the parents is the trustee, the payor may have greater    
assurance that the life insurance proceeds will serve their intended purpose, and the 
custodial spouse may have greater confidence that the insurance will remain in 
effect.  A trustee may be obligated, by the terms of the trust agreement, to inform 
the parent receiving child support payments if funds are not received by the trustee 
to pay premiums due or if the life insurance is cancelled. 
A fourth consideration favoring creation of a trust to own the life insurance is 
that one former spouse may not be comfortable with the other owning any interest 
in life insurance on his or her life.64  Any concern that one former spouse would 
harm the other for insurance proceeds is diminished if a trustee other than the   
former spouse owns and is the beneficiary of the policy.  Finally, where a trust 
owns the life insurance, the custodial parent has greater assurance that, if he or she 
dies, the minor child will still be adequately provided for.  Thus, use of a trust to 
own life insurance provided to secure child support is worthy of consideration. 
II. LIFE INSURANCE TO PROTECT ALIMONY 
The court has authority in a dissolution of marriage proceeding to order the 
spouse obligated to pay periodic alimony to purchase and maintain life insurance 
on his or her life as necessary to assure that alimony owed will be paid.65  The need 
for security must be properly pled unless it is litigated by consent.66  Where the 
need for security is not pled the consent to trial of the issue may be express or   
implied.67  The entry of an order requiring the payor spouse to purchase and    
 ________________________  
 64. See, e.g., Robbins, 802 So. 2d at 476. 
 65. Fla. Stat. § 61.08(3) (2009).  “[S]uch an award is a matter within the discretion of the court.”  Goodwin 
v. Goodwin, 640 So. 2d 173, 176 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1153 
(Fla. 1989)). 
 66. See, e.g., Miulli v. Miulli, 832 So. 2d 963, 964 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002). (where the need for life 
insurance to secure alimony was neither pled nor litigated by consent, it was reversible error for the trial court to 
order the payor spouse to maintain insurance). See also Lowe v. Lowe, 789 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2001) (former wife’s failure to raise claim that former husband should be required to obtain life insurance to 
secure alimony until hearing on motion for contempt precluded trial court from ordering former husband to obtain 
insurance); Williamitis, 741 So. 2d at 1177. 
 67. See, e.g., Stalnaker v. Stalnaker, 892 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (where the need for 
security to assure payment of alimony was not pled, the court determined that it was raised by implied consent 
during trial without objection based on the facts.  During trial the wife’s counsel asked the wife if she desired 
security and the wife said she did.  The wife’s counsel asked the husband if he objected to naming the wife as 
beneficiary on his life insurance, and the husband said he objected.  The husband’s counsel did not object to these 
questions during trial). 
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maintain a life insurance policy for this purpose is not routine or automatic.68   
Special circumstances demonstrating a need for security must be shown to exist 
before an order requiring the purchase or maintenance of life insurance will be 
entered.69  Where the payor enters into an agreement requiring him to provide   
specified life insurance to secure alimony the court cannot increase that obligation 
unless the court makes all requisite findings.70  Even where special circumstances 
exist, the court must make specific findings about the amount of insurance needed, 
that the insurance is available, and that in light of the cost of the insurance the 
payor spouse has the ability to afford it.71  The spouse who seeks imposition of a 
requirement that the payor spouse purchase or maintain life insurance has the    
burden of proof.72  Where proof is lacking, insurance is not required.73  Failure of 
the trial court to make specific findings on each point to be proved is reversible 
error,74 unless the record reflects sufficient competent evidence to justify the trial 
court’s determination.75 
Special circumstances may exist in a variety of situations justifying imposition 
of a life insurance maintenance requirement.  Special circumstances are present 
 ________________________  
 68. Ruberg v. Ruberg, 858 So. 2d 1147, 1156-57 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Privett, 535 So. 2d at 665. 
 69. Massam v. Massam, 993 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Konsoulas v. Konsoulas, 904 
So. 2d 440, 445 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Stalnaker, 892 So. 2d at 563; Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So. 2d 
709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.  2004); Ruberg, 858 So. 2d at 1156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Forgione v. Forgione, 
845 So. 2d 968, 970 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 70. Lorman, 633 So. 2d at 106.  In Lorman, the husband agreed to continue to maintain an existing life 
insurance policy on his life to secure both alimony and child support payments.  The policy provided a 
$325,000.00 death benefit.  The trial court committed reversible error when it required the husband to obtain an 
additional $250,000.00 insurance on his life without determining it was needed, its cost or that it was available. 
 71. Massam, 993 So. 2d at 1022; Byers, 910 So. 2d. at 346; see also Plichta v. Plichta, 899 So. 2d 1283, 
1287 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.  2005) (A trial court’s finding that the cost of insurance “was not prohibitive” is alone 
inadequate to prove that the payor is able to obtain and afford the insurance); Alpha, 885 So. 2d at 1034         
(Additional evidence in the record, including the testimony of the husband, who was an insurance agent, as to the 
monthly cost for the insurance was adequate proof of cost.  The insurance mandate was nevertheless reversed, due 
to lack of proof that there was a need for security); Stalnaker, 892 So. 2d at 563. 
 72. Levy v. Levy, 900 So. 2d 737, 745 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 73. Id.; Plichta, 899 So. 2d at 1287; Solomon v. Solomon, 861 So. 2d 1218, 1221 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2003); Lapham v. Lapham, 778 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); see also Smith v. Smith, 912 So. 
2d 702, 705 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (where a trial court order requiring a husband to maintain life insurance 
to secure alimony was reversed due to the trial court’s failure to make any of the required findings); Cozier v. 
Cozier, 819 So. 2d 834, 836-37 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (where due to lack of evidence of the cost of life 
insurance, or that the payor spouse could obtain life insurance or afford the premiums, it was reversible error to 
require him to provide life insurance to secure alimony payments.  This was true although the payor was insured 
under a group term insurance policy through his employment); Hedendal, 695 So. 2d at 392 (where the trial court 
erroneously required the husband to maintain a $1,500,000.00 policy insuring his life for the benefit of the wife, 
although there was no proof of need to secure alimony); Keith v. Keith, 537 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1989) (where the trial court erroneously required a former husband to maintain $150,000.00 in life insurance 
on his life to secure payment of $1,000.00 per month in alimony owed to the former wife, without evidence of the 
necessity for security). 
 74. See Massam, 993 So. 2d at 1022; Norman v. Norman, 939 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006);  
Alpha, 885 So. 2d at 1033-34; Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 866 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Cissel, 845 
So. 2d 993; Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 755 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Privett, 535 So. 2d 663 
(where the trial court’s failure to determine need was reversible error); see also O’Connor v. O’Connor, 782 So. 2d 
502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Schere v. Schere, 645 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (where the trial courts’ 
failure to consider the cost of insurance and the financial impact of paying premiums on the payor was reversible 
error, where special circumstances were demonstrated). 
 75. Forgione, 845 So. 2d at 969-70; Hedendal, 695 So. 2d at 391-92. 
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when the recipient spouse proves that a need exists for life insurance to secure 
payment of alimony.76  Where the spouse receiving alimony payments would suffer 
significant financial harm due to the likelihood of future alimony arrearages special 
circumstances exist.77  While no one fact is determinative, factors considered by 
the courts to ascertain if special circumstances exist include: 
 
!" Limited earning capacity of the recipient of alimony;78 
 
!" Payor engaged in a dangerous occupation;79 
 
!" Illness of the payor;80 
 
!" Failure of the payor to adhere to prior agreements requiring maintenance of 
life  insurance;81 
 
!" Prior history of nonpayment of support;82 
 
!" Recipient’s inability to support himself or herself or to maintain his or her 
 standard of living if alimony payments ceased;83 
 ________________________  
 76. Longo, 533 So. 2d at 795 (citing Solberman v. Solberman, 516 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987)). 
 77. Massam, 993 So. 2d at 1022.  In Massam, because the husband who was obligated to pay alimony had 
poorly managed his finances and businesses previously and attempted to file bankruptcy to avoid payment of 
alimony, future nonpayment of alimony was likely and special circumstances existed.  See also Nelson v. Nelson, 
795 So. 2d 977, 985-86 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 78. Id. (Where the recipient spouse’s poor health prevents him or her from accepting gainful employment, 
special circumstances exist). See also Forgione, 845 So. 2d at 970 (where the wife’s age (48), limited            
employability options, prior employment being only for her husband’s business, lack of education, lack of assets, 
and her inability to earn a sufficient sum to pay her reasonable living expenses together justified the court’s   
conclusion that special circumstances existed. The husband’s poor health was a further factor considered by the 
court as supporting a finding of special circumstances). Sasnett v. Sasnett, 679 So. 2d 1265, 1269 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996) (where the recipient lacked employment skills); Alpha, 885 So. 2d at 1034 (where the court noted that 
special circumstances exist where due to “age, ill health or lack or employment skills” the recipient spouse would 
suffer severely if the payor died). 
 79. Byers, 910 So. 2d at 346. The payor was an airline pilot regularly flying commercial airplanes on 
international routes after September 11, 2001.  This was sufficient to constitute a special circumstance, justifying 
the need for life insurance to protect alimony. 
 80. Bohner v. Bohner, 997 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (payor previously suffered from  
cancer). See also Forgione, 845 So. 2d at 970 (where payor’s condition was likely to be fatal). 
 81. Bohner, 997 So. 2d at 454 (The former husband designated persons other than his former spouse and 
children as policy beneficiaries, despite the existence of a marital agreement requiring him to provide life      
insurance to secure alimony and child support obligations). 
 82. Watrous v. Watrous, 961 So. 2d 1121, 1122 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Smith, 912 So. 2d at 702, 
704-05; Alpha, 885 So. 2d at1023, 1034;  Merkin, 804 So. 2d at 597-98; Moorehead, 745 So. 2d at 552. 
 83. Bohner, 997 So. 2d at 457; Watrous, 961 So. 2d at 1121-22; Sasnett, 679 So. 2d at 1268. Special  
circumstances may exist where the payor and the recipient are wealthy, as long as the recipient would suffer  
economic jeopardy if alimony payments ceased.  Nelson, 795 So. 2d at 986.  In Nelson, equitable division of   
marital assets resulted in the former husband receiving in excess of $3,100,000.00 and the former wife receiving in 
excess of $1,100,000.00.  To equalize the distribution, the former husband was ordered to execute a promissory 
note in the principal sum of $1,000,000.00 plus 7.5% per annum interest in favor of the former wife, secured by 
stock in the former husband’s business.  The former wife was also awarded $1,000.00 per month alimony.  The 
court upheld a requirement that the former husband keep in effect a $150,000.00 life insurance policy insuring his 
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!" Other wealth owned by the recipient;84 
 
!" Illness or disability suffered by the recipient;85 
 
!" Age of the parties;86  and 
 
!" Presence of minor children residing with the alimony recipient.87 
 
In contrast, where there is no evidence that the payor spouse has been or is 
likely to be delinquent in paying alimony, that the recipient spouse suffers from 
disability or health problems preventing her from working and supporting herself if 
the payor dies, and the recipient spouse has sufficient assets and earning capacity to 
support herself if alimony ceases due to the payor’s death, special circumstances do 
not exist.88  Where the “husband is in good health and the wife would not be left in 
dire economic straits upon the untimely death of the husband” special                
circumstances do not exist.89  The existence of other assets payable to the spouse 
receiving alimony if the payor dies, such as retirement plan benefits, may obviate 
the need for life insurance to secure alimony.90 
Special circumstances must be adequately set forth in detail in the final    
judgment for a requirement imposed by the court on a payor spouse to maintain life 
insurance to be upheld.91 Where special circumstances exist, evidence must also be 
offered to establish that the payor spouse is insurable, the cost of the insurance, and 
that the payor spouse has the ability to pay premiums.92  The amount of premiums 
  
life to secure alimony.  In reaching its conclusion, the court took into account the facts that (1) the trial court gave 
the former wife a lien against the husband’s closely held corporate stock to assure payment of the promissory note;  
(2) the trial court refused to allow the former wife to perfect her security interest to avoid interference with    
operation of the former husband’s business; (3) the former husband might not pay the promissory note; (4) if the 
former husband died the former wife might not be able to collect on the promissory note; and (5) if the former wife 
did not receive payment on the promissory note her financial circumstances would change radically.  In light of the 
foregoing facts, although the former wife would own in excess of $1,000,000.00 in assets, it was proper for her 
alimony awarded to be secured by insurance. 
 84. The recipient spouse may not own significant assets. See, e.g., Sasnett, 679 So. 2d at 1268-69.  
 85. Smith, 912 So. 2d at 704; Alpha, 885 So. 2d at 1034; Sasnett, 679 So. 2d at 1269; Child v. Child, 34 So. 
3d 159, 162 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (where the wife receiving alimony was legally blind). 
 86. Smith, 912 So. 2d at 704-05. 
 87. Child, 34 So. 3d at 162; Smith, 912 So. 2d at 704-05. 
 88. Ruberg, 858 So. 2d at 1157; accord Moorehead, 745 So. 2d at 552. 
 89. Baker, 763 So. 2d at 495 (the spouses were both in their 40s and the wife was capable of working). 
 90. Where the wife receiving alimony would be entitled to military survivor benefits if the payor husband 
died, the court suggested that life insurance to secure alimony might be unnecessary. Zimmerman, 755 So. 2d at 
730. 
 91. Massam, 993 So. 2d at 1024; Jaworski, 972 So. 2d at 1096; Merkin, 804 So. 2d at 598. In Merkin, 
although the record reflected the husband’s prior failure to pay temporary alimony as ordered by the court, the 
failure to expressly state in the final judgment the circumstances relied on by the court in ordering life insurance to 
secure alimony payments was reversible error.   
 92. Zangari v. Cunningham, 839 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); see also Child, 34 So. 3d at 
162 (where the trial court neglected to determine the cost, amount or availability of insurance, and the failure 
constituted reversible error). 
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due to maintain the insurance may decrease the amount of alimony otherwise 
owed.93 
The fact that the payor spouse owns insurance on his or her life at the time of 
dissolution of marriage reflects that he or she was insurable when the insurance 
was purchased.  It does not always follow that the payor spouse is still insurable at 
all, or at the same premium cost.94  It may, however, reflect that insurance is   
available to secure payment of alimony without purchase of a new policy, avoiding 
the need to prove that the spouse is insurable, and may evidence the insured 
spouse’s ability to pay premiums.95  If it is asserted that the payor spouse already 
owns life insurance, absent the payor’s admission of that fact and relevant details 
about the insurance, proof is required that the insurance exists before an order 
mandating continuation of the policy may be entered.96 
The recipient spouse has the burden of establishing the amount of life            
insurance needed and the cost.  Absent evidence and appropriate findings on these 
points, it is reversible error for a court to order purchase or maintenance of life 
insurance.97 Testimony of an expert witness about the amount of insurance     
available and the cost and duration of a policy should be offered.98  The amount of 
insurance required must be based on the amount of alimony owed.99  For this    
 ________________________  
 93. Norman, 939 So. 2d 240; see also Sobelman, 541 So. 2d at 1154 n.2 (where the Court noted, “any 
requirement to pay premiums [on life insurance for the benefit of a former spouse] should be taken into account in 
the determination of the amount of alimony”). 
 94. Massam, 993 So. 2d at 1024; but see Bohner, 997 So. 2d at 454 (where a magistrate found the payor 
spouse had the ability to obtain life insurance based on expert testimony introduced by the recipient spouse and the 
fact that the payor was already insured for $1,000,000.00.  Even if the payor’s medical conditions precluded the 
purchase of a new insurance policy at an affordable premium, use of existing insurance to secure payment of 
alimony may be appropriate.  Also, the fact that the payor already has a policy in place may be used to prove his 
ability to pay premiums). 
 95. See, e.g., Richardson, 722 So. 2d at 281. The husband, age 63, had three life insurance policies in place 
on his life, providing $47,000.00 in death benefits.  Within two years after the dissolution of marriage, the policies 
would continue in force without further payment of premiums. 
 96. See, e.g., Struble v. Struble, 787 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (where the trial court’s    
judgment that a husband continue to maintain a $300,000.00 life insurance policy on his life to secure alimony 
owed was erroneous, due to the absence of proof that the former husband owned a $300,000.00 policy).  Id. at 50.  
The evidence reflected that the former husband owned a $100,000.00 life insurance policy on his life, he was 
insured under a second policy of unknown amount through his job, and he owned two additional policies each 
paying $1,000.00 in benefits on his death. Id. 
 97. Konsoulas, 904 So. 2d at 445; Zangari, 839 So. 2d at 920; see also Struble, 787 So. 2d at 50 (where it 
was error for the trial court to order maintenance of life insurance to secure alimony, without first determining the 
cost of insurance, the former husband’s ability to pay premiums and the financial impact on the payor);          
Zimmerman, 755 So. 2d 730 (where it was reversible error to order the husband to provide a $100,000.00 life 
insurance policy to secure $50.00 per week alimony payments, without evidence of the cost and availability of the 
policy or a finding that the husband could afford the premiums).  Accord Smith, 811 So. 2d 840 (Where no    
evidence was offered and the motion to require the payor spouse to obtain life insurance was made after the   
evidentiary hearing concluded,  the court remanded the case for further proceedings). 
 98. In Bohner, 997 So. 2d 454, a former wife sought to compel the former husband to comply with the 
terms of a marital settlement agreement requiring his purchase of life insurance on his life to guaranty payment of 
alimony and child support.  The former wife’s expert testified about the ability to obtain a $1,000,000.00 life  
insurance policy on the former husband’s life, and the costs of both a ten year term policy and a fifteen year term 
policy providing $1,000,000.00 or $650,000.00 in death benefits. 
 99. Zangari, 839 So. 2d at 920; see also Brogdon v. Brogdon, 530 So. 2d 1064, 1066 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 1988) (where it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to require the former husband to maintain a 
$100,000.00 life insurance policy on his life to secure alimony owed of a much lower sum). 
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purpose, both direct cash support payments and indirect alimony should be             
considered.100 
Before a court orders a spouse to obtain or maintain life insurance to secure 
alimony payments, the financial impact on the payor must be considered.101  While 
illness of the payor may be evidence that special circumstances exist, the same fact 
may increase the cost of the insurance. This could adversely affect the payor’s  
financial condition to the extent that a requirement to maintain life insurance is not 
practical or warranted. If the payor’s medical condition is severe it may not be 
possible to purchase life insurance, and other security authorized under the statute 
needs to be investigated. 
Care is needed in drafting the final judgment provision requiring maintenance 
of life insurance.   
A final judgment that requires life insurance as security must    
specify how the proceeds are to be paid upon the obligor spouse’s 
death-whether the life insurance is security for unpaid support    
obligations that might encumber only a portion of the proceeds, or 
whether all of the proceeds will go to the payee spouse to          
minimize economic harm to the family.102 
It is not adequate for the final judgment to merely state the amount of            
insurance the payor is to maintain to secure alimony.103  Instead, the judgment 
should specify if on the payor’s death the recipient receives all insurance proceeds 
or only a sum equal to past due alimony.104  If the final judgment states that the life 
insurance merely secures payment of alimony, absent a contrary provision in a 
marital settlement agreement, on the payor spouse’s death the recipient spouse 
should receive only so much of the life insurance policy proceeds as required to 
satisfy any alimony remaining unpaid, rather than all policy proceeds.  Where the 
 ________________________  
 100. See Haydu, 591 So. 2d at 656 (where the husband was required to provide medical and dental insurance 
for his former wife, secured by life insurance). 
 101. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d at 1154 n.2; Forgione, 845 So. 2d at 970; Zimmerman, 755 So. 2d 730; Milo v. 
Milo, 718 So. 2d 343, 345 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).  In Milo, the trial court ordered the former husband to 
maintain life insurance “if reasonably available” with a death benefit of $250,000.00 to secure alimony payments.  
Both former spouses appealed the trial court’s decision. The former wife objected to the court imposing a      
requirement only if insurance was reasonably available.  The former husband objected to requiring maintenance of 
life insurance without evidence and determinations of the cost of the insurance, the former husband’s ability to pay 
premiums and the financial impact on the former husband.  The husband was already insured during the marriage 
under one whole life insurance policy and a $100,000.00 term life policy through his job.  The appellate court 
reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to make appropriate findings. Id. at 345. 
 102. Massam, 993 So. 2d at 1024; Plichta, 899 So. 2d at 1287; see also Merkin, 804 So. 2d at 598 (where 
the court noted that the failure to specify in the final judgment how insurance proceeds were to be distributed on 
the payor’s death was unacceptable.  Absent this information it was unclear if the life insurance was to serve a 
purpose other than satisfying arrearages owed at the payor’s demise.  Without express direction on this point, it 
was not possible for the appellate court to determine if the amount of insurance required was appropriate in light of 
the alimony owed.); Rowland, 868 So. 2d at 613 (where it was reversible error for a court order to require the 
former husband to maintain a $300,000.00 life insurance policy on his life to secure both alimony and child   
support  payments, without specifying how the insurance proceeds were to be distributed if the husband died). 
 103. Kearley, 745 So. 2d at 988. 
 104. Id.  (“Either arrangement may be appropriate, but those terms must be certain”). 
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final judgment includes ambiguous and conflicting provisions causing confusion 
about whether the life insurance is to secure only child support or also alimony 
payments, the judgment is defective.105 
It is advisable for the court order or agreement to state who is to own the life 
insurance and who is to be the beneficiary named on the policy. Where an    
agreement incorporated into a final judgment of dissolution required a husband to 
maintain a life insurance policy so long as alimony or child support payments were 
required, the husband was found to be in compliance when naming a trust as     
beneficiary so long as the former spouse and children were trust beneficiaries.106  
Thus, if the alimony recipient objects to use of a trust to own or be beneficiary of 
the life insurance, a provision precluding use of a trust or expressly specifying who 
will own and be named beneficiary of the policy needs to be included in the court 
order or marital settlement agreement.  Where life insurance is ordered to protect 
both payments of alimony and child support, it is error to require payor to name 
only the minor child as beneficiary.107  Where life insurance is ordered to be   
maintained to secure only alimony payments, it is not error to require the recipient 
spouse to be named irrevocable beneficiary of the life insurance until the payor 
spouse retires.108  Because the obligation to pay alimony ends on the payor’s death, 
no insurance proceeds would be considered paid as invalid post-mortem            
alimony.109 
Differing views initially existed between the districts about whether a court, 
absent a voluntary agreement of the parties, might properly order life insurance 
proceeds to be payable to the recipient spouse in excess of the alimony owed as of 
 ________________________  
 105. See, e.g., Cissel, 845 So. 2d at 995. In Cissel, the final judgment of dissolution stated, in pertinent part: 
8.  Life Insurance Security For Child Support:  As security for the Husband’s child support 
obligation the Husband shall maintain a life insurance policy having a death benefit of 
$500,000.00.  The Husband shall maintain said insurance for so long as the Husband has 
continuing obligation to pay child support and alimony to the Wife on behalf of the minor 
child.  Said life insurance benefits may be decreasing in term provided that the death benefit 
is sufficient to secure the Husband’s child support obligation. 
A dispute arose about whether the life insurance was required to secure payment of child support only, or also to 
secure payment of alimony.  The former husband also claimed the amount of insurance was excessive. 
 106. See, e.g., Turner, 507 So. 2d at 171.  In Turner, the final judgment provided in pertinent part: 
6.  As long as the Husband is required to pay alimony and support to the Wife and child as 
set forth herein, he shall keep in effect a current life insurance policy having a minimum 
face value of $200,000.00.  The Husband shall furnish the Wife written proof of the      
payment of the premiums within thirty (30) days of the due date. 
After the divorce the former husband changed the policy beneficiary from the wife to a trust.  The trust agreement 
required policy proceeds to be used to pay alimony as long as it was owed, and provided for payment of child 
support.  Any sums remaining in the trust benefited the parties’ child once all alimony and child support owed 
were paid.  The court held that the former husband’s creation of a trust did not violate the final judgment, and the 
former husband was not required to name the former wife or child beneficiary of the policy. 
 107. Brahmer, 596 So. 2d at 518.  
 108. Benson v. Benson, 503 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).  A further point for counsel to address 
where life insurance is only required until the payor/insured retires is when that retirement may occur.  Issues 
involving timing of retirement and early retirement are beyond the scope of this article. 
 109. Id. at 385. 
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the payor’s death.110  The view initially espoused by the Fourth District and Fifth 
District was that life insurance proceeds payable under a court ordered policy to 
secure payment of alimony could not exceed the alimony owed on the payor’s 
death.111  The alimony owed on the payor’s death included any lump sum alimony 
payable in the future.112  Their reasoning was that, as the obligation to pay alimony 
ends with the payor spouse’s death,113 absent a voluntary agreement of the payor to 
the contrary, the obligation could not be extended or increased by a court directing 
the purchase or maintenance of life insurance by the payor spouse on the life of the 
payor spouse for the benefit of the recipient.114  “Alimony was initially conceived 
as a necessary corollary to the common-law obligation of a husband to provide his 
wife with the necessities of life.  Thus, alimony terminated upon the death of the 
husband . . . .”115  The statute allowing the payment of alimony to be assured by life 
 ________________________  
 110. See Longo, 533 So. 2d 791 (holding that a court lacks authority to order use of life insurance proceeds 
to pay alimony not owed as of the payor spouse’s death).  Note that Longo was decided prior to Sobelman, 541 So. 
2d 1153. 
 111. Longo, 533 So. 2d at 795; see also Privett, 535 So. 2d at 665; Perkins v. Perkins, 310 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1975) (holding that a court cannot, in a dissolution of marriage action, require a husband to maintain 
insurance on his life to support his former wife following his death, because the obligation to pay alimony ends on 
the payor’s death).  There was also support from other districts of this view.  See, e.g., Keith, 537 So. 2d at 139; 
Putnam v. Putnam, 154 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963). 
 112. Keith, 537 So. 2d at 140. 
 113. Eagan, 392 So. 2d at 989; Plant v. Plant, 320 So. 2d 455, 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). 
 114. The court explained its reasoning in Longo stating that the statute: 
[P]ermits a court to require acquisition or continuation of a life insurance policy . . . to      
secure an alimony award.  The discretion to impose a requirement for insurance is carefully 
limited: It may only be exercised ‘to the extent necessary to protect an award of  
alimony . . .’ The language seems very clear and therefore in our view leaves no room for 
the application of rules of statutory construction.  It is perhaps simplistic to explain that we 
take the word ‘secure’ used in this context not to be used as a synonym for ‘obtain’ but  
rather to refer to a device (such as a mortgage) to safeguard payment of an obligation.  The 
statute provides a method of securing or protecting an alimony award. It contains no  
language expressly creating a new duty or expanding an existing one. 
It seems trite to suggest that had the legislature intended to overturn venerable precedent it 
would have ‘said so.’  However, the legislature is presumed to be cognizant of the rules of 
law that a particular enactment will affect.  It is doubtful if post-mortem alimony . . . [was] 
intended to be engrafted upon Florida law by unartful legislative draftsmanship and          
innuendo. 
We make one final observation on the issue although others (such as public policy          
considerations and economics) come readily to mind.  If we assume that the amendment   
authorized post-mortem alimony, does such an award terminate upon the surviving spouse’s 
subsequent remarriage?  death?  inheritance of several million dollars?  Does post-mortem 
alimony burden the obligor spouse’s estate if that spouse dies before the purchase of life   
insurance is completed?  Or where no insurance is contemplated?  Simply stated, more 
problems are created than are solved by reading into these amendments something that the 
legislature never intended. 
Longo, 533 So. 2d at 794-95; see also Eagan, 392 So. 2d at 988; and cases from the First, Third and Fourth   
Districts cited therein. 
 115. Longo, 533 So. 2d at 793.  Thus, even where in a separation agreement incorporated into a final   
judgment of dissolution a husband promised to pay support to his wife until her death or remarriage, his obligation 
ended with his demise absent express provision in the agreement that his estate remained liable to continue    
payments.  O’Malley v. Pan American Bank of Orlando, N.A., 384 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1980); see also In Re   
Freedland’s Estate, 182 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1966). 
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insurance on the payor spouse’s life could not expand or extend the underlying 
obligation.116  Thus, prior to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Sobelman v. 
Sobelman,117 in the Fourth District the order directing use of life insurance to    
protect an alimony award had to be drafted to allow only payment of arrearages on 
the death of the payor spouse.118  The Fifth District agreed.119 
Contrary views were expressed.  It may be viewed as contradictory to ask the 
trial court in a dissolution of marriage action to determine both that one spouse has 
the ability to pay alimony, and that arrearages in future payments are likely.120  
Public policy behind alimony is to provide support to the payor’s former spouse, 
and this policy may be furthered by giving the recipient a windfall of life insurance 
policy proceeds for future support after the death of the payor spouse.121  The 
Second District supported use of life insurance to assure payment of alimony even 
after the death of the payor spouse, when the recipient depended on alimony for her 
support or would be in desperate financial circumstances if the payor spouse died 
and alimony ceased.122  The court’s authority to require life insurance to be     
maintained for a purpose not limited to paying arrearages owed at the payor’s   
demise found support in the First District.123  Yet, other Second District cases   
purported to limit use of life insurance proceeds only to satisfy arrearages owed on 
the payor’s death.124 
To avoid violating the prohibition once perceived to exist on a court requiring a 
payor spouse to pay alimony after payor’s death, absent voluntary agreement of the 
payor, yet still provide life insurance proceeds on the payor’s life to benefit the 
 ________________________  
 116. After amendment of Fla. Stat. § 61.08(3) (1985) the argument was unsuccessfully advanced by a wife 
in a dissolution action that the statute impliedly authorized the court to impose liability for alimony owed after 
payor’s death on payor’s estate.  Clark v. Clark, 509 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).  The court rejected 
the wife’s argument. 
 117. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d at 1153. 
 118. Longo, 533 So. 2d at 795. 
 119. Moore v. Moore, 543 So. 2d 252, 257 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (A final judgment requiring   
insurance to be maintained on the payor’s life or for the recipient spouse to be named the beneficiary on an    
existing policy should specify that policy proceeds may only be used to pay alimony arrearages owed on the 
payor’s death). 
 120. Longo, 533 So. 2d at 796 (Stone, J. dissenting).  Consistency in these two positions may exist if a court 
is determining that the payor has the financial wherewithall to pay premiums, but is not sufficiently responsible to 
actually make the payments. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Kearley, 745 So. 2d at 990 (Altenbernd, J. concurring). 
 123. Fiveash v. Fiveash, 523 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).  The court ordered the payor to 
maintain $75,000.00 in life insurance on his life to assure that alimony would be paid to his former wife in the 
event of his death, as her financial condition was tenuous.  Because the insurance company rather than the former 
husband’s estate would remit the proceeds to the recipient spouse, the former husband was not being improperly 
required to pay alimony after his death.  Id. at 765.  The court certified the following question to the Florida   
Supreme Court: “Does § 61.08(3) Florida Statutes (1985) authorize a trial court to require an alimony paying 
spouse to maintain a life insurance policy securing said alimony award, such that upon the death of the paying 
spouse the receiving spouse is only entitled to receive from the insurance the sum total of any existing alimony 
arrearages?”  Id.  If any response was forthcoming it is not of record.  In Fiveash the appellate court affirmed the 
trial court’s order that the former husband maintain the insurance and found no abuse of discretion. Id.  The   
decision was criticized in Longo, 533 So. 2d 791. 
 124. Dwyer v. Dwyer, 513 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).  The court in Dwyer required the final 
judgment to be corrected to reflect that life insurance proceeds were only payable for alimony arrearages.      
However, in Dwyer both spouses agreed that the trial court erred by requiring the payor to maintain the policy on 
which the alimony recipient was the primary beneficiary.  Id. at 1327. 
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alimony recipient, consideration should be given in determining whether life     
insurance could be awarded as lump sum alimony.125  Where a divorcing husband 
owned life insurance on his life and his former wife would be destitute if he died 
and alimony payments ceased, as part of the alimony the former wife was awarded 
ownership of the insurance on the former husband’s life and was designated the 
irrevocable beneficiary of each policy.126  The former husband was required to pay 
all premiums due and interest on policy loans.127  To assure that the policy 
proceeds would serve the purpose for which they were intended, the court included 
in its order that the former wife could not assign the policies, surrender them or 
borrow against them. Further, if she died or remarried prior to the former          
husband’s death the policies would revert to him, and the husband could then    
designate another beneficiary. The parties involved were required to notify the  
issuing insurance companies of the court imposed conditions.128 
“Lump sum alimony may be awarded as a means of insuring an equitable    
distribution of property acquired during the marriage, or to provide for the wife’s 
further needs for continuing support.”129  Should the court awards a former spouse 
a life insurance policy on the life of the other spouse as lump sum alimony, as   
opposed to securing payments of periodic alimony, the insured may be required to 
pay policy premiums.  The premiums are additional periodic alimony.130  In that 
situation, the former spouse receiving the insurance as lump sum alimony should 
be both the owner and the beneficiary of the policy, able to assure that the recipient 
is informed of non-payment of premiums and other facts affecting the continuation 
of the policy.131  To avoid misunderstandings and needless litigation, the court  
order imposing a life insurance requirement should clearly specify that the        
 ________________________  
 125. Stith v. Stith, 384 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).  The court stated the dilemma as follows: 
In a continuing marriage, a husband who has not accumulated substantial assets may use life 
insurance to provide his wife with an adequate estate for her protection in the event of his 
death.  We think it unfortunate to forbid imposing such an arrangement on an ex-husband 
for the benefit of his ex-wife on the theory that the life insurance under such circumstances 
can only be viewed as security for an alimony obligation and, therefore, is improper because 
the alimony obligation cannot extend beyond death. 
Id. at 320-21; see also McClung v. McClung, 465 So. 2d 637, 638 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Noe v Noe, 431 
So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
 126. Stith, 384 So. 2d at 32. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  The court also required the parties to obtain and file with the trial court written acknowledgements 
from each insurance company of the conditions imposed, and the court retained jurisdiction to modify the award if 
circumstances changed.   
 129. Noe, 431 So. 2d at 658.  In Noe the trial court required the former husband to keep in effect, without 
encumbrances, a $50,000.00 life insurance policy on his life the former husband owned prior to the divorce.  The 
former wife was to remain the named beneficiary until all child support of $2,500.00 per child per year was paid, 
and until all permanent periodic alimony of $21,000.00 per year was paid or until the former wife’s remarriage or 
death.  The former husband unsuccessfully challenged the requirement that he maintain the life insurance,     
asserting that it improperly required him to pay alimony after his death. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. If it is not possible to cause the recipient of the life insurance to become the policy owner, the  
insurance may not be properly part of lump sum alimony. McClung, 465 So. 2d at 639. 
19
: Life Insurance in Dissolution of Marriage
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2011
76 Barry Law Review Vol. 16 
 
insurance policy is awarded to the recipient as lump sum alimony where that is the 
case.132 
One spouse may be awarded lump sum alimony secured by life insurance on 
the payor’s life.133  In that situation, it is permissible for a court to order the payor 
to maintain life insurance on the payor’s life until the obligation is satisfied.134  Fla. 
Stat. § 61.08(3) is not limited to “circumstances where the wife’s rights do not  
terminate at death.”135  Where life insurance is ordered to be maintained as security 
for lump sum alimony, the same proof of payor’s insurability, cost of insurance and 
payor’s ability to pay premium is still required.136 
The differing views of the districts about whether life insurance could be      
required by a court with proceeds benefitting the alimony recipient after the 
payor’s death were resolved by the Florida Supreme Court, interpreting § 61.08(3), 
Fla. Stat. to authorize use of life insurance “either to satisfy [arrearages] or to    
otherwise protect the receiving spouse in appropriate circumstances”.137  Sobelman 
involved a contested divorce where the parties did not reach an agreement.  The 
trial court ordered the husband to pay alimony and child support, and to purchase 
life insurance to secure the alimony award.138  The husband objected to the life 
insurance requirement, claiming it was not authorized by Florida Statute as the 
proceeds could exceed alimony arrearages owed at his death, and that such excess 
amounted to a requirement to pay post death alimony.  The question facing the 
Florida Supreme Court was “whether a party obligated to pay alimony may be  
ordered to maintain life insurance as security for the alimony award without      
limiting the insurance obligation and the payment of insurance proceeds to accrued 
alimony arrearages.”139  After reviewing the purposes of applicable statutes and 
determining that they are to be liberally construed, the Court answered the question 
in the affirmative.140  The Court held that a “trial court, as an integral part of the 
equitable distribution and support scheme, [may] order an obligated spouse to   
purchase life insurance . . . to protect the financial well being of the other spouse, 
as well as any arrearage owing from alimony obligations.”141 Any insurance 
 ________________________  
 132. Both McClung and Noe present examples of situations in which the failure of the court order to specify 
whether life insurance was awarded to secure payment of periodic alimony or as lump sum alimony gave rise to 
further litigation. 
 133. Gepfrich v. Gepfrich, 510 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).  “As partial equitable distribution 
of the assets accumulated during the marriage, the wife was awarded as lump sum alimony the husband’s interest 
in the marital home, plus $270,000, payable in installments over three years.  The husband was ordered to     
maintain life insurance equal to the outstanding balance of the lump sum and rehabilitative alimony.”  Id. at 369. 
 134. Id. at 370. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Miulli, 832 So. 2d at 964. 
 137. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d at 1155. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1154.  The Court determined that the statute then applicable, Fla. Stat.  § 61.08(3) (1985), which 
included identical language to the current provision, was ambiguous, because it did not expressly state either that 
life insurance could only be ordered to secure alimony and for no other purpose, or that life insurance could be 
ordered for purposes other than securing alimony.  The Court recognized that a purpose of statutes related to  
dissolution of marriage is to protect and prevent harm to spouses and their children in divorce, and that the    
dissolution of marriage statutes are thus to be liberally construed.  Id. 
 141. Id. 
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proceeds received by the surviving spouse on the death of the payor were not    
impermissible post-death alimony, because the proceeds would be paid by the  
insurance company rather than by the payor spouse or his estate.142  The Court did 
not define or explain what constituted appropriate circumstances in which it is 
permissible for a court to order life insurance to protect the financial well being of 
the spouse receiving alimony.  Because the Court generally referred to protecting 
the well-being of the spouse receiving alimony,143 courts now interpret appropriate 
circumstances to include support of a former spouse after the death of the payor 
spouse, at least where need is demonstrated.  Today, in appropriate circumstances, 
one spouse may be required by the court (as opposed to by consent in a marital 
settlement agreement) to provide life insurance for a purpose other than to pay  
alimony arrearages owed at the payor’s death.144 
The parties in a divorce may voluntarily agree that life insurance will be     
purchased and proceeds will be used to pay post-death support.145 Where a        
husband and wife agree that they will create a life insurance trust to be funded with 
life insurance on the life of the payor spouse, the recipient spouse may receive  
benefits in excess of the amount of alimony owed at the payor’s death.146  The 
agreement should provide that the court reserves jurisdiction to enforce life       
insurance provisions.  When enforcement of such an agreement is sought and the 
agreement recites that the purpose of the life insurance is to secure payment of  
alimony, the court may still be required to determine that special circumstances 
exist supporting a need for life insurance, that the payor has the ability to obtain 
life insurance, the cost of the insurance, and that the payor has the ability to afford 
the insurance premiums.147 
While the statute expressly refers to use of life insurance to secure alimony, it 
also contemplates other security. One Florida court used a commercial annuity 
contract to protect against nonpayment of alimony during life or after death of the 
payor spouse.148  Another court attempted use of a survivor benefit plan.149  “[T]he 
trial court can order an obligor spouse to secure his obligation with any assets 
which may be suitable for that purpose.”150  Not all assets one spouse offers or  
proposes as security are appropriate. A promissory note reflecting a debt the     
recipient spouse owed to the payor of alimony is not an appropriate security where 
 ________________________  
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. In Jones v. Jones, 789 So. 2d. 1234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001), the trial court required the former 
husband to provide life insurance only to secure alimony arrearages.  On appeal, the Fourth District remanded the 
case directing the trial court to consider whether “other appropriate circumstances required the husband to     
maintain life insurance.”  Id.  This expressly recognized that Sobelman authorized the court to order maintenance 
of life insurance by one former spouse in favor of the other for purposes other than securing alimony. 
 145. Bohner, 997 So. 2d at 457. A question may arise concerning whether the payment of alimony for  
periods after the payor spouse’s death constitutes alimony for federal income tax purposes. 
 146. In Bohner, 997 So. 2d 454, the parties entered a marital settlement agreement in connection with their 
divorce.  This agreement was incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution of their marriage.  The agreement 
expressly provided that alimony obligations would survive the payor’s death. Id.; see Moore, 543 So. 2d at 257. 
 147. Bohner, 997 So. 2d 454. 
 148. Watrous, 961 So. 2d 1121. 
 149. Wrinkle v. Wrinkle, 592 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
 150. Lapham, 778 So. 2d at 489.   
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it is to be forgiven on the payor’s death, as it may constitute impermissible     
postmortem alimony.151 
The parties cannot avoid the requirements to prove need, special circumstances 
and the other prerequisites to mandating life insurance (other than insurability of 
the payor) by use of another security.  Where an annuity was required as security, 
the trial court’s failure to determine if the annuity was available, if the husband 
could purchase it, and the financial impact payment for the annuity would have on 
the husband were grounds for reversing the decision.152  The appellate court did not 
determine the propriety of requiring purchase of an annuity rather than a life     
insurance policy. On remand, among other things, the trial court was directed to 
consider whether mandating purchase of an annuity was appropriate.153 
A final factor which must be considered before imposing a requirement to  
purchase or maintain life insurance to secure alimony is the financial effect of  
premium payments.  The cost of premiums may alter the amount of alimony to be 
paid or the equitable distribution of marital assets.154 This is true even if the      
recipient spouse is to pay part of the cost of the security.155 
Dissolution of marriage proceedings, insofar as they affect the requirement to 
provide life insurance to secure payment of alimony, are not always concluded by 
the time of the death of the spouse obligated to pay alimony.  If the payor spouse 
dies before all appeals are filed and finally decided, before the life insurance is 
obtained following an order or agreement requiring it, or after entry of a judgment 
in which the court reserved jurisdiction, proceedings pertaining to life insurance 
may continue after the death of the payor spouse.  In these situations, questions 
about whether the circuit court retains jurisdiction and who is a proper party to 
represent the payor’s estate may arise.  In one instance a court entered a final 
judgment of dissolution of marriage, ordering the husband to purchase and      
maintain a life insurance policy to secure payment of alimony.156  The husband 
died the following day.157  The personal representative of his estate appealed and 
successfully sought reversal of the trial court’s decision.158 
Once alimony is awarded it may be modified or terminated in subsequent   
proceedings.  If this occurs, the life insurance initially required to be maintained 
 ________________________  
 151. Id. In Lapham a husband and wife married, divorced, married each other a second time, and again 
sought a divorce.  In the first divorce the wife was awarded the marital home, but was required to sign a         
promissory note for $70,000.00 payable to the husband.  The note was payable without interest on the wife’s sale 
of the home or her death.  In the second divorce proceeding the husband offered the promissory note as security 
for his payment of alimony, and the note was to be cancelled if the husband died before the wife.  The court  
indicated that cancellation of the debt was likely payment of post-death alimony. Hence, the security was      
unacceptable. 
 152. Watrous, 961 So. 2d at 1122. 
 153. Id. at 1123. 
 154. Sasnett, 679 So. 2d at 1269; Schere, 645 So. 2d 21. 
 155. See Wrinkle, 592 So. 2d at 761, where it was held inconsistent and erroneous for the court to determine 
that a wife was entitled to a set sum in alimony, and then to decrease that sum by requiring her to pay for the 
survivor’s benefit plan securing the alimony.  Instead, if security was warranted, the payor spouse alone paid the 
cost. 
 156. Forgione v. Forgione, 845 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 157. Id. at 969. 
 158. Id. 
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should be specifically addressed.159 However, if alimony is initially awarded   
without a need to secure it with life insurance, when the court later modifies the 
alimony award the districts differ on whether the court has authority under Fla. 
Stat. § 61.14 to impose a requirement for the first time that the award be secured by 
insurance.160  The First District has held that this new security requirement cannot 
first be imposed when alimony is revisited.161  Contrary views were expressed and 
the conflict certified.162  The possible inability to obtain security after the divorce is 
final increases the importance of obtaining security at the time of dissolution of 
marriage. 
The importance of precise wording about life insurance in a marital settlement 
agreement or final judgment of dissolution should not be overlooked.  Detailed 
accurate wording may avoid future litigation.  An agreement should clearly specify 
the purpose for which life insurance is required.  That purpose might be to secure 
alimony, as property settlement or to accomplish another specified goal.163  Not 
every change in circumstances occurring after a final judgment of dissolution is 
entered warrants a modification of the requirement to maintain a life insurance 
policy.  To determine if a change in life insurance provisions is appropriate, it is 
necessary to know if the insurance was initially required as security for alimony, 
lump sum alimony, equitable distribution, or for another purpose.  For example, 
where one spouse acquired a vested interest in a life insurance policy insuring her 
former husband in the divorce proceeding, when her husband thereafter sought 
modification, no change was authorized to adversely affect the wife’s vested 
rights.164  The outcome might have been different if the continuation of the        
insurance had been merely court ordered, rather than by agreement of the parties, 
or had been merely to secure payment of alimony. 
Orders requiring payment of alimony, including those imposing a requirement 
to maintain life insurance, may be modified.165  The wording of the initial provision 
in the prior agreement or order has considerable impact.166  In one case, a husband 
signed a marital settlement agreement requiring him to maintain his former wife as 
beneficiary of one-half of the total life insurance on the husband’s life in force at 
 ________________________  
 159. Kilpatrick v. Sanders, 541 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) reflects a situation where a trial 
court terminated a former husband’s obligation to pay alimony and maintain life insurance. The trial court’s  
decision was reversed on other grounds. 
 160. Burkhart v. Burkhart, 731 So. 2d 733, 735 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 161. Id.; but see Carter v. Carter, 164 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964). 
 162. Dziuba v. Dziuba, 784 So. 2d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Stern v. Stern, 75 So. 2d 
810 (Fla. 1954)); Black v. Miller, 219 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969). 
 163. In Liss v. Liss, 937 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)  The court was called upon to determine if 
a provision in a marital settlement agreement, incorporated into a final judgment of dissolution, allowing a former 
wife to purchase life insurance policies on her former husband’s life as she deemed appropriate permitted her to 
purchase and keep in effect a $1,000,000.00 policy insuring her former spouse’s life despite his objection.     
Because the agreement did not expressly state whether any policy purchased by the wife was to secure alimony, to 
secure child support, was property settlement or was for another purpose, the court held the agreement ambiguous.  
Id. at 763.  Despite the agreement expressly stating that the wife had an insurable interest in the husband’s life, that 
might no longer be accurate as the wife had remarried, her right to alimony terminated, and child support       
remaining due was far less than the sum she sought to secure by another life insurance policy. 
 164. Sedell, 100 So. 2d at 640-41. 
 165. Yedlin v. Yedlin, 464 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 166. Id. 
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the time of divorce, and to continue this designation until the former wife’s death 
or remarriage.167 In a series of transactions the former husband cashed in his     
existing life insurance, retained the cash value, and purchased replacement term 
insurance.168  However, one-half of the new term insurance provided a lesser death 
benefit than the former wife was entitled to receive.169  The former husband filed a 
petition for modification of his alimony obligations.170  The court held that the  
former husband had the right to cash in the policies and to retain the cash proceeds, 
as long as he replaced the polices with term insurance providing the same death 
benefit to the former wife required in the divorce proceeding.171  The former wife 
had no rights to any portion of the cash surrender value or to require the husband to 
maintain the whole life policies in effect at the time of dissolution of the marriage, 
nor did she acquire a vested interest in the policies because the marital settlement 
agreement did not include these provisions.172  It is advisable for a court order or 
marital settlement agreement to state what the parties are required to do with     
respect to life insurance, as well as what actions they are prohibited from taking in 
the future.   
III. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF LIFE INSURANCE 
In an action for dissolution of marriage, it may be necessary for the court to  
determine whether life insurance owned by a spouse is a nonmarital asset or a   
marital asset, and to ascertain which spouse is entitled to own the life insurance 
after dissolution of the marriage.173  Only life insurance with a cash value is subject 
to equitable distribution.174  This may, in part, explain why term insurance owned 
by a divorcing spouse is frequently not mentioned in the dissolution action. 
The trial court is required to consider a variety of factors to determine which 
assets a spouse is entitled to retain as his or her property after the marriage        
terminates.  One factor is whether the asset is or is not marital property, which may 
depend on when and how the asset was acquired.175  An asset acquired by one party 
prior to the marriage is generally nonmarital property, and belongs to the spouse 
who owns it.176 Appreciation in value of one spouse’s separate non-marital      
 ________________________  
 167. Id. at 246. 
 168. Id. at 246-47. 
 169. Id. at 247. 
 170. Id. On appeal the parties disagreed on whether the former husband was entitled to retain the cash 
proceeds of the original life insurance policies redeemed. 
 171. Id. at 248. 
 172. Id.; see Yedlin, 464 So. 2d at 247. 
 173. Fla. Stat. § 61.075 (2009) provides that the court shall determine how all marital and nonmarital assets 
are to be equitably distributed. 
 174. Lakin v. Lakin, 901 So. 2d 186, 189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).  Although term life insurance is not 
a subject of equitable distribution, there is no prohibition preventing its ownership and beneficiary designation 
from being specified in a marital settlement agreement. To minimize further disputes and unintended             
consequences, it is advisable to address term insurance in an agreement if the term insurance is to remain in effect, 
and to expressly specify if the parties agree that a term policy is to lapse. 
 175. Winney v. Winney, 979 So. 2d 396, 400 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
 176. Id. 
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property during the marriage as a result of marital funds expended on the asset, or 
efforts of one spouse during the marriage, may constitute marital property.177 
The initial determination of whether a life insurance policy with cash value is a 
marital asset, a non-marital asset, or partly a marital asset may be complicated.  
Where the life insurance policy was acquired during the marriage and premiums 
were paid using marital assets, the policy is a marital asset.  In contrast, where the 
policy was acquired by one spouse and paid for in full prior to the marriage, or paid 
for during the marriage by the insured spouse with separate non-marital assets, the 
policy is likely separate non-marital property of that spouse.178  Difficulties may be 
encountered when one spouse purchased and paid premiums on a life insurance 
policy on his or her life prior to the marriage, and premium payments from marital 
assets continued during the marriage. The court may then be called upon to       
determine the proportion of the policy constituting marital as opposed to           
non-marital assets. The answer depends, in part, on the type of insurance policy 
involved. Where the policy is a whole life or universal life policy, it should be 
possible to determine the cash value of the policy on the date of the marriage and 
on the date of filing of a petition for dissolution, as well as the total premiums paid 
prior to and during the marriage.  The increase in cash value during the marriage, 
assuming that premiums were paid with marital funds, may readily be accounted 
for. 
The situation is more complex when the type of policy involved is a variable 
life policy or universal variable life policy.179  A component of these policies is the 
existence of an investment account.  The policy owner directs which one or more 
mutual funds are to be used as investment vehicles within the policy.  If the      
investments are profitable, the value of the policy increases.  Conversely, if the 
mutual funds suffer losses the value of the policy declines.  “When a premium is 
paid into a VUL [variable universal life] policy, the insurance company deducts the 
cost of insurance and certain fees, and the remainder is invested in the funds in the 
separate account chosen by the owner of the policy.”180  One court considering 
such a situation observed: 
Because the separate account of a VUL policy is, in essence, no 
different than a brokerage account, the considerations involved in 
attempting to establish the value of the marital portion of the     
policy are not the same as the considerations relevant to the        
determination of the cash value of other types of cash value       
policies, such as whole life.  Instead, the value of the separate    
account of a VUL policy must be determined in the same manner 
 ________________________  
 177. Id. 
 178. Although no case law on point was located, it is likely accurate that a life insurance policy owned by 
one spouse insuring the life of the other spouse, paid for solely by the owner of the policy with non-marital funds 
of the owner, is non-marital property of the owner. In this situation the insured may object to the owner’s      
continued retention of the policy. 
 179. Abdnour v. Abdnour, 19 So. 3d 357, 365 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 180. Id. 
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as one would determine the value of securities held in a brokerage 
account.181 
The court follows several steps to compute the portion of the cash value of the 
separate investment accounts owned in the policy representing marital assets. The 
first step is to ascertain the number of shares in each mutual fund owned in the 
policy on the date of the marriage.  The second step is to determine the number of 
shares of each mutual fund owned in the policy on the date the petition for         
dissolution was filed.  Third, the court ascertains the total marital funds used to pay 
premiums from the date of the marriage to the date of filing of the petition for   
dissolution.  The difference between the number of shares in mutual funds owned 
in the policy between the date of the marriage and the date of filing the petition for 
dissolution acquired with marital funds is the portion of the policy investment 
which is potentially a marital asset, depending on the total sums expended to    
purchase units or shares during the period.  The value of those shares may be    
ascertained based on the pershare or perunit price on the date the petition for     
dissolution was filed.182 
Further calculations may be required depending on the facts and circumstances.  
For example, if the cash account in the VUL policy also increased during the    
marriage, this increase may need to be added to the value of the marital property 
portion of the policy.183 The computation may be further complicated where      
investments changed over time, so that mutual funds owned at one time differed 
from the mutual funds owned in the policy when a petition for dissolution was 
filed. Such circumstances would require tracing. It may be advisable to award the 
policy to one spouse, and to award other marital assets of value equal to the marital 
portion of the life insurance to the other spouse. This would allow the court to 
avoid difficult or imprecise calculations, and potential adverse income tax         
consequences in a forced liquidation of the policy.184 
The marital settlement agreement entered by the parties and incorporated into a 
final judgment of dissolution of marriage may give one former spouse a vested 
property interest in a life insurance policy, whether it be the entire amount of the 
proceeds or just a portion, where the policy insures the life of the other former 
spouse.185  One or both spouses may own life insurance at the time a petition for 
dissolution of marriage is filed.186  If one spouse owns insurance on his or her life 
 ________________________  
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 365-66.  The per share value may also be determined at the time of trial.  Id. at 367. 
 183. Id. at 366 n.19.  In Abdnour, the cash value had been depleted so no additional calculation was needed. 
 184. Id. at 367. 
 185. See Yates v. Yates, 272 F. 2d 52 (5th Cir. 1959); Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639. 
 186. See Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 2008 WL 1886032 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (the husband owned a 
$40,000.00 term life insurance policy on his life at the time of dissolution of the marriage); Duffey, 972 So. 2d at 
290 (during the marriage the husband maintained a life insurance policy paying $1,500,000.00 on his death to his 
wife, and the policy lapsed due to nonpayment of premiums); Byers, 910 So. 2d at 341 (the husband, a           
commercial airline pilot, had $140,000.00 in employer provided life insurance plus “an accidental death policy 
purchased through the pilots’ union”). Cozier, 819 So. 2d at 834; Nelson, 795 So. 2d at 985 (prior to filing the 
petition for dissolution the parties jointly owned two life insurance policies totaling almost $1,000,000.00);   
Kearley, 745 So. 2d at 989.  In Kearley, the husband’s employer provided a term life policy on his life.  The   
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other than term life insurance, the cash surrender value of the policy may be a   
marital asset to be equitably distributed in the divorce.187  If cash value is to be 
divided between the spouses and the policy continued in effect, it may not be    
appropriate for one spouse to remain the sole beneficiary as part of equitable     
distribution.188  The conclusion would likely be impacted by which spouse is to 
own and pay for the policy in the future, and what other assets the parties each  
received.  Where cash value exists in a life insurance policy and the court does not 
allocate it to a party, but instead requires the insurance to be continued by the   
insured for the benefit of the other spouse, it may be assumed that the required 
equitable distribution did not occur.189  That outcome is not certain.  Better practice 
is to expressly state in the agreement if the life insurance is property settlement to 
secure alimony, or is lump sum alimony. 
Where, during the marriage, one spouse owns life insurance on his life, and the 
marital settlement agreement requires him to maintain the policy, retain his former 
wife as primary beneficiary and his children as alternate beneficiaries, after the 
agreement was incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution, a dispute arose 
about the nature of the wife’s interest.  The wording of the agreement did not make 
her interest clear.  The court held that the former wife had a vested interest in the 
policy.190  Because the wife relinquished rights to other assets in the agreement and 
the agreement did not state that the insurance was to be maintained to secure   
payment of alimony or child support, the former wife’s rights in the policy were 
part of property distribution.191 
The purpose for which life insurance on the life of one former spouse is    
maintained has multiple consequences.  One impact is the duration for which the 
policy must remain in effect.  Absent an agreement to the contrary, the payor of 
premiums may be entitled to cease payments when the policy is to secure child 
support after all child support is paid.  The payor may not generally cease        
payments when the policy is to secure alimony, until the death or remarriage of the 
recipient spouse.  A consequence of the policy being part of a property settlement 
is the ability to secure future modification of the agreement or judgment.  Absent 
proof which would generally justify cancellation or change of a contract, a court 
will not modify a property settlement provision distributing a life insurance policy 
or rights to proceeds to one former spouse.192  This is a different, more rigorous 
standard than that applied where a change in alimony or child support is sought by 
  
husband also owned a whole life policy on his own life, paying $93,000.00 in benefits on his death.  The whole 
life policy had a $4,000.00 cash surrender value at the time of filing the petition for dissolution.   
 187. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d at 1154 n.2; see Norman v. Norman, 939 So. 2d 240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); 
see Eagan, 392 So. 2d at 990; Lakin, 901 So. 2d at 189; see also Kearley, 745 So. 2d at 989 (Altenbernd, J.   
concurring). Where a life insurance policy has no cash value, the policy is not to be included as part of equitable 
distribution.   
 188. Kearley, 745 So. 2d at  989 (Altenbernd, J., concurring). 
 189. Eagan, 392 So. 2d at 990. 
 190. Sedell, 100 So. 2d at 642. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
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the payor post dissolution.193  The income tax consequences to the former spouse 
paying premiums may vary depending on whether the policy is property settlement 
(resulting in no deduction to the payor and no income to former spouse benefited), 
to secure child support (also resulting in no tax deduction to payor and no income 
to policy beneficiary, and possible allowing dependency exemptions), or to secure 
alimony (where premiums paid may be deductible to payor and income to policy 
beneficiary).194  Issues may arise, necessitating future litigation, where the initial 
court order or agreement entered when the divorce occurs does not sufficiently 
categorize the life insurance benefit. 
A vested interest in proceeds of a life insurance policy insuring the former  
husband was obtained by the former wife when, in a marital settlement agreement 
incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution, the former husband promised to 
both satisfy the mortgage on the former wife’s home, and assure that the proceeds 
of life insurance on his life would be used for this purpose if he died before       
satisfying the mortgage.195  Due to the first wife’s vested equitable interest in the 
policy proceeds, decedent’s second and surviving spouse, who was named        
beneficiary on the policy, could only receive the proceeds to the extent they were 
not needed to pay off the first wife’s mortgage.196  However, where the applicable 
divorce documents merely require one spouse to name a former spouse beneficiary 
of a life insurance policy, the spouse named beneficiary does not necessarily     
acquire a vested interest in the policy or the cash surrender value.197 
One spouse may be covered by life insurance through an employee welfare 
benefit plan at the time of dissolution of marriage. Where the uninsured spouse 
waives claims to alimony and child support in exchange for being named          
irrevocable beneficiary of life insurance in the plan, the insurance proceeds are part 
of the property settlement.198  In that situation, the beneficiary’s rights vest with the 
divorce agreement and the insured forfeits any rights to thereafter change the    
beneficiary designation.199 
If one spouse owns life insurance on his life with a cash value, and the owner is 
required to maintain the insurance to secure alimony and/or child support        
payments, as long as the insurance remains as security it is improper to attribute the 
policy’s cash value to the owner as property settlement.200  This conclusion follows 
 ________________________  
 193. Generally, alimony awards may be modified by a court on proof of a substantial, permanent,         
involuntary, unanticipated change of circumstances.  Fla. Stat. § 61.14(1).  The change may impact payor’s ability 
to pay and/or may be a result of the recipient’s needs.  The requirement that payor maintain life insurance to assure 
payment of alimony is likewise subject to review under this standard. 
 194. 26 I.R.C. § 62(a)(10) (1984), 26 I.R.C. § 71(a) (1984), 26 I.R.C. § 215(a) (1984).  Alimony payments 
are generally deductible for income tax purposes to the payor and included in the recipient’s gross income. 
 195. At the time of the divorce the husband owned two life insurance policies insuring his life, paying in 
excess of $25,000.00 on his death.  Despite his promise to his first wife, after their divorce he named his second 
wife beneficiary of both policies.  After his demise both women claimed rights to a portion of the proceeds and an 
interpleader action was instituted by the insurance companies. Id. at 53-54. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Yedlin, 464 So. 2d at 245. 
 198. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1353 (M.D. Fla. 1999). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Plichta v. Plichta, 899 So. 2d 1283, 1286-87 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
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because the owner spouse cannot benefit from the cash value while the life       
insurance is maintained as security.201 
It is important to ascertain all insurance on each spouse’s life in dissolution of 
marriage proceedings. In addition, the type of insurance (e.g., term, whole life, 
universal life, or variable life), as well as the owner, death benefit, and cash value 
should be determined.  Life insurance on one spouse’s life may already be owned 
by the other spouse, or may be owned by a trust or other third party for the benefit 
of the non-insured spouse and/or the parties’ children. A loan against a life        
insurance policy owned by a spouse during the marriage should be accounted for as 
a liability in the dissolution action.202  Unless all details about the insurance are 
discovered, the policy or policy proceeds cannot be adequately accounted for in the 
divorce proceedings.  That may result in future litigation over the policy or loss of 
a valuable asset when neither spouse pays premiums due after dissolution of the 
marriage.203 
Florida case law reflects situations where a life insurance policy or benefit    
existed, and may not have been sufficiently addressed in the dissolution of        
marriage action.  In Cozier v. Cozier, the husband was provided with term         
insurance by his employer.204  The court’s opinion did not reflect any specific   
allocation of the policy or its proceeds to one spouse because term insurance lacks 
cash value.  In another case, a substantial policy insuring one spouse was allowed 
to lapse due to nonpayment of premiums.205  If the lapse occurred after the petition 
for dissolution was filed, as the insured suffered medical problems which may have 
precluded purchase of a new policy at the same premium, the parties might have 
been better served by continuing the policy.  Unless the existence of life insurance 
polices already owned is disclosed or discovered early in the dissolution action, 
one spouse may improperly access, sell, or cancel the policies;206 or the policy may 
lapse due to nonpayment of premiums. 
Where life insurance is owned by one party who agrees to maintain it, any 
agreement should clearly specify if the policy or proceeds are part of division of 
marital assets or if the policy is maintained for another purpose. Failure to         
expressly specify may result in a loss of rights to the spouse anticipating receipt of 
the policy proceeds if the insurance does not remain in effect.207 
 ________________________  
 201. Id. 
 202. See Konsoulas v. Konsoulas, 904 So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 203. No Florida law presently requires that life insurance be continued, premiums be paid, beneficiaries not 
be changed or owners of term insurance not be changed on the filing of a petition for dissolution.  To maintain the 
status quo during the pendency of a dissolution action and to assure that policies are not allowed to lapse and that 
potentially valuable assets are not lost, it may be advisable for counsel to seek an appropriate order requiring 
payment of premiums and preventing the taking of loans or the making of other changes with respect to the policy 
while the dissolution action is pending.  This may present an issue on which the legislature should act. 
 204. Cozier, 819 So. 2d at 836. 
 205. Duffey, 972 So. 2d  at 290. 
 206. Nelson, 795 So. 2d at 985.  While married, the parties jointly owned two life insurance policies paying 
death benefits of almost $1,000,000.00.  After the parties separated, the husband cashed in the policies, retained 
$80,000.00, and purchased new insurance solely owned by him, solely insuring his life, paying about 
$1,000,000.00 to his estate. 
 207. Mitchell v. Combank/Winter Park, 429 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).  A former husband, 
obligated by a marital settlement agreement to maintain life insurance on his life naming his former wife       
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Where one spouse is awarded ownership of the policy insuring the other 
spouse, a copy of the life insurance policy should be obtained and carefully       
reviewed.  The premiums owed, due dates for payment, and other rights and     
obligations of the new owner should be ascertained. The issuing insurance       
company should be notified of the change of ownership and any change of        
beneficiary.  Failure to adequately ascertain rights of the policy owner may result 
in loss of benefits.  For example, where a wife was awarded a ten year level term 
insurance policy insuring her former husband, and she failed to timely exercise her 
right to renew the policy after the term expired, the policy lapsed and she was not 
entitled to benefits on her former husband’s death.208  The former wife’s claim that 
she was entitled to notice of renewal from the insurance company, when the policy 
did not require that any notice be given, was erroneous.209 
The divorcing spouses may seek to provide for one of them in the future by the 
purchase of additional life insurance on the lives of one or both of them.210  If such 
action is to be taken as part of a property settlement, terms and conditions should 
be specifically stated.  These include any limits on the amount of life insurance to 
be purchased, who will pay premiums, who will own the policy, who will be the 
beneficiary, whether any beneficiary designation is revocable, and the type of   
insurance to be purchased.  Attention should be paid to timing, where one former 
spouse will have the right to purchase life insurance on the life of the other, to  
assure that the purchaser will still have an insurable interest in the insured’s life at 
the time of policy purchase.211  Because the insured’s consent to any policy       
insuring his or her life is generally required, a provision is needed in any agreement 
assuring that the proposed insured will cooperate and sign reasonably required 
documents to effectuate the insurance purchase. 
Not all persons are agreeable to their former spouses owning or being named 
beneficiaries of life insurance on their lives.212  The insured may, with or without 
cause, fear harm from a former spouse who would benefit financially from the  
insured’s death.213  Where an agreement incident to the divorce allows one former 
  
beneficiary, neglected to do so.  On his death the former wife had no recourse, because the agreement did not state 
that the insurance proceeds were property distribution. 
 208. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Lovallo, 8 So. 3d 1242 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 209. Id. at 1243.  There was no applicable statute requiring notice of renewal to the policy owner.  In   
contrast, Fla. Stat. § 627.4555 (2008), requires an insurance company to give notice to an owner of a life insurance 
policy before the policy lapses for non-payment of premiums.  The court noted, however, that it was not ruling on 
whether any communication between the former wife (policy owner) and the issuing insurance company       
constituted a request to renew the policy, or imposed any duty on the issuing insurance company to inquire further. 
The only issue before the court was whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
former wife.  The appellate court reversed the award of summary judgment and remanded the case. 
 210. Nelson, 795 So. 2d at 985 (the former wife was authorized to purchase life insurance on the former 
husband’s life). 
 211. Insurable interest has been defined as “such an interest, arising from the relations of the party obtaining 
the insurance, either as a creditor of or surety for the assured, or from the ties of blood or marriage to him, as will 
justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life.”  Liss v. Liss, 937 So. 2d 
760, 764 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).  A former spouse who is no longer owed alimony or other obligation from 
his or her former spouse after dissolution of their marriage may lack an insurable interest in the former spouse’s 
life, and thus may be unable to purchase a policy. 
 212. Robbins v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 802 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 213. Id. 
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spouse to own, purchase or be designated beneficiary of life insurance on the other 
former spouse’s life, he may be bound by that agreement, especially where the 
uninsured spouse pays the policy premiums.214 
Other circumstances may also impact on equitable distribution of life insurance 
with cash value.  Insurance on the life of one spouse may have been gifted to the 
other during or prior to the marriage. Also, the insurance may be funding          
obligations owed to third parties, such as business buy-out agreements or securing 
payment of a mortgage to a lender.  All facts and circumstances related to existing 
insurance need to be ascertained so that the life insurance could be properly dealt 
with in the dissolution action. 
IV. TRUSTS OWNING LIFE INSURANCE  
As already noted, a party to a dissolution action may own life insurance on his 
or her own life, or on the life of his or her spouse.  A divorcing spouse may also 
own insurance on the life of another person, or may be a current or future trustee or 
beneficiary of a trust owning life insurance on one or both spouses or on the life or 
lives of third parties.  This section of the article describes several circumstances in 
which insurance may be so owned, and suggests actions which may be appropriate 
to address future ownership and rights.215 
There are three common situations in which one or both spouses may own    
insurance on the life of one or more other persons. The first is where the life     
insurance insures the life of one or both parents of one spouse.216 For estate     
planning purposes, a parent may arrange for his or her child to purchase and own 
life insurance on the parent’s life.  The parent frequently provides cash to the child 
who owns the policy through annual exclusion tax free gifts to enable the child to 
pay policy premiums.  It is also possible that the child paid all or a portion of the 
premiums due, either from the child’s separate property or from marital assets.  
 ________________________  
 214. Id.  In Robbins a father was ordered to pay child support secured by life insurance on his life.  He failed 
to remit child support.  Mediation and an agreement followed, in which his former wife was given the right to own 
two life insurance policies insuring her former husband and paying $200,000.00 on his death. One of those    
policies was purchased by the former wife after the divorce, and premiums on both polices were paid by the  
former wife.  The former husband, without evidence supporting his claims, feared harm from the former wife.  He 
attempted to interfere with her ability to continue the policies. The insurance company brought a declaratory 
judgment action, in which the court ruled that the former wife had an insurable interest in the former husband, 
based on the court orders and mediated agreement. 
 215. This section of the article does not purport to be all inclusive.  It is recognized that life insurance may 
be owned in a variety of factual settings not mentioned.  This section of the article first attempts to alert the reader 
to the need to consider situations other than the direct, straight forward ownership by a divorcing party of life    
insurance on that party’s or his or her spouse’s life. The second purpose of this section of the article is to       
introduce the reader to Florida trust law the reader may not otherwise contemplate in the midst of handling a 
dissolution action.  Because the statutes referenced in this section of the article are relatively newly enacted, scant 
case law applying or interpreting them is currently available.  Thus, this section of the article should be viewed as 
merely setting forth basic introductory information. 
 216. While the example refers to a parent, a grandparent or other relative of one spouse may engage in 
analogous planning.  Thus, counsel in a dissolution action should inquire if either divorcing spouse owns or is the 
beneficiary of life insurance on the life of anyone other than parties to the dissolution action. 
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The purpose of the insurance may be to replace wealth lost in the parent’s estate 
due to payment of estate taxes on the parent’s death, to provide liquidity on the 
parent’s death to pay bills, debts, and taxes owed by the parent without forced sales 
of assets owned by the parent at death under unfavorable conditions, or merely to 
provide a greater gift to the child at the parent’s death, not reduced by payment of 
federal estate taxes.  The child owning the entire policy, or an interest therein, 
would generally also be a beneficiary of the policy.  The policy may be a whole life 
policy, universal life policy, a term policy, or another type of insurance. 
The particular facts and circumstances in a given case will dictate if the policy 
insuring a parent’s life is a marital or non-marital asset. The point here is that    
regardless of how the asset is categorized, action is generally warranted to assure 
that the spouse whose parent is insured retains ownership of and all rights to the 
policy after dissolution of the marriage.  Irrespective of how this is accomplished, 
absent an express intent by the parties for the child-in-law to retain rights as an 
owner or beneficiary of the policy, the child-in-law’s rights should be terminated in 
the dissolution action.  If the child-in-law of the insured was a policy owner and/or 
a beneficiary, all paperwork required by the insurance company that issued the 
policy to change the owners or designate new beneficiaries should be completed 
and filed with the insurance company.  Appropriate provisions should be included 
in any marital settlement agreement to require the child-in-law owning an interest 
in the policy to relinquish his or her ownership rights. If owners of the policy    
include persons other than the child-in-law’s spouse, federal tax consequences may 
result from the transfer of ownership.217 
A second situation which one or both spouses may own insurance on the life of 
a third party is in the business context.  One spouse may be a co-owner of a     
business with one or more persons.  The business may be a partnership, corporation 
or other entity.  In this context the owners of the business may own insurance on 
each other’s lives.  The purpose of this insurance is likely either to provide        
liquidity to continue business operations if one owner dies, or to provide cash to 
purchase a deceased owner’s interest in the business.  If this life insurance exists, 
the spouse who will retain ownership of the business interest after the divorce 
should become the sole owner and sole beneficiary of the life insurance on a       
co-owner’s life, to the exclusion of the other spouse. 
A third situation considered is where one or both spouses own or are            
beneficiaries of life insurance on the life of their child.  Unless the parties resolve 
in the divorce who will own and be beneficiary of the policy in the future and how 
premiums will be paid, future disputes and perhaps unnecessary litigation are    
likely, and the insurance may lapse due to nonpayment of premiums. 
In the foregoing situations, the divorcing parties, as policy owners, may have 
the ability to make needed changes without immediate adverse federal income tax 
 ________________________  
 217. To illustrate, if mother’s life is insured under a $1,000,000.00 policy with a $200,000.00 current value, 
and children A and B, as well as children-in-law, C and D, own the policy, when A and C dissolve their marriage 
C should relinquish her ownership rights in the policy.  If C does so, causing A, B and D to own the policy,   
taxable gifts may have been made by C to B and D. 
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consequences.  The actions required and the persons who need to be involved are 
more complicated when an irrevocable trust owns the life insurance.  Due to the 
potential estate tax savings when an irrevocable trust owns life insurance, such 
ownership is a frequent occurrence. Where life insurance is owned by an           
irrevocable trust, and one or both spouses are insured under policies owned by the 
trust, or are trustees and/or trust beneficiaries, specific information should be    
gathered.  First, the identity of each grantor who created the trust and whether each 
is living and competent, deceased, or incompetent should be determined.  Second, 
the identity of each current trustee and each person named a successor trustee 
should be ascertained from the trust document. Third, the identity of each          
beneficiary of the trust should be determined.  The beneficiaries may need to be 
categorized as either qualified beneficiaries218 or other beneficiaries.  A qualified 
beneficiary includes persons entitled to trust benefits immediately, or if the trust 
delays benefits until the death of the insured, those persons then entitled to income 
or principal from the trust.  A qualified beneficiary also includes anyone entitled to 
trust benefits if one or more persons initially entitled to trust benefits die. In      
contrast to a qualified beneficiary, a beneficiary of the trust includes anyone with 
an interest in the trust now or at any time in the future.219  Fourth, the identity of the 
one or more persons insured under the policy or policies owned by the trust should 
be determined.  Finally, the amount and type of insurance owned by the trust, as 
well as the current value of the insurance and premiums due to keep the insurance 
in force, should all be ascertained.  Each of the foregoing factors impacts on the 
available courses of action and their consequences.220 
When irrevocable trusts are drafted, it would be useful at times if persons 
named as present or future trustees or beneficiaries were so designated only if they 
remained family members. To illustrate, if wife creates an irrevocable trust       
designating her husband a trustee, the trust might entitle him to serve “only if and 
 ________________________  
 218. Fla. Stat. § 736.0103(14) (2006) defines a qualified beneficiary as:  
a living beneficiary who, on the date the beneficiary’s qualification is determined: 
(a)  Is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal; 
(b)  Would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the      
interests of the distributees described in paragraph (a) terminated on that date without    
causing the trust to terminate;  or 
(c)  Would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the trust 
terminated in accordance with its terms on that date. 
See also Fla. Stat. § 736.0110 (2006) for further persons who may be treated as qualified beneficiaries, including 
charitable organizations, trust enforcers and the Attorney General. 
 219. Fla. Stat. § 736.0103(4) (2006) includes in the definition of beneficiary “a person who has a present or 
future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent, or who holds a power of appointment over trust property 
in a capacity other than that of trustee.” 
 220. The explanation provided in this section of the article is based on the premise that the irrevocable trust 
is a Florida trust, with a Florida situs, governed by Florida law.  The suggestions and conclusions set forth are not 
applicable where another state’s laws govern the trust or the trust is administered in another jurisdiction.  The 
terms of the trust agreement and Fla. Stat. § 736.0801, should allow counsel to determine if a trust is a Florida 
trust. 
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so long as he is married to the grantor or was so married at the time of her death, 
and no action for dissolution was then pending.” A similar provision naming   
grantor’s daughter-in-law as a successor trustee might allow her to serve “only if 
she is then married to grantor’s son or was married to grantor’s son on his death.”  
Trust provisions are not routinely drafted in this fashion to account for a future 
divorce.  Hence, when a divorce occurs, the grantors or other persons interested in 
a trust may find they are no longer pleased with the trustees, successor trustees or 
beneficiaries designated in the trust agreement.  Because the trust is irrevocable, 
grantors may lack standing to take action to change the trust’s provisions. 
One situation warranting consideration is where one or both of the divorcing 
spouses created the irrevocable trust, and the trust owns life insurance on the life of 
one or both of them.  If neither spouse is presently a trustee, neither is named a 
successor trustee and neither is a beneficiary of the trust, no changes to the trust 
may be required.  The principal determinations to be made would likely be whether 
the parties wish for the trust to continue for the benefit of their children or the other 
named beneficiaries, how premiums are to be funded in the future, and whether the 
existing and successor trustees named in the trust agreement are still acceptable.  If 
the parties remain pleased in all respects with the trust agreement, what remains to 
resolve in the dissolution action is how future premiums are to be paid to keep the 
insurance in force.  Because the insurance would not necessarily be available to 
secure child support in this scenario,221 and no spouse is a beneficiary of the trust, it 
would appear that agreement of the parties is required. A court does not have    
statutory authority to mandate continued contributions to a trust to pay premiums in 
this instance.  Depending upon the type of insurance owned by the trust and its loan 
value, it may be possible for premiums to be paid by the trustee borrowing against 
the policy. 
In the example set forth above, if the divorcing spouses want the trust to     
continue but now object to one or more of the current trustees or successor trustees, 
further action may be warranted.  This could occur where the parties named family 
members as trustees and now prefer for independent trustees to serve.  The trust 
agreement should be consulted for any provisions allowing a grantor or the       
beneficiaries to change the trustees.  If such a provision exists, it may permit the 
desired changes in trustees to be effectuated by complying with its terms.  Absent 
an applicable provision, the resignations of the trustees whose services are no  
longer desired should be sought.  If all trustees resign and the successors nominated 
in the trust agreement decline to serve because all are deemed unacceptable to the 
divorcing couple, court appointment of a mutually agreeable trustee may be 
sought.222  If only some, but not all of the currently serving and future trustees 
 ________________________  
 221. If the payor of child support is the only insured under the life insurance policy owned by the trust, the 
parties’ minor children are the trust beneficiaries, and the trust provides for their support, it may be possible for the 
insurance owned by the trust to secure child support.  The terms of the trust agreement must be reviewed.  The 
trust agreement may preclude the use of trust assets to satisfy a parental obligation of support.  Also, the insured 
spouse may object to the children remaining beneficiaries of the trust after the child support obligation has been 
fulfilled, or being required to fund the trust after all child support has been paid. 
 222. The circuit court has jurisdiction to appoint a trustee.  Fla. Stat. § 736.0201(4)(b) (2006).  A court will 
generally not permit a trust to fail merely for lack of a trustee.  A resigning trustee or a beneficiary of the trust, 
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named in the trust agreement are viewed as unacceptable, court action is avoided.  
Instead, currently serving unacceptable trustees are asked to resign and any       
unacceptable future trustee designated is asked to irrevocably waive his or her right 
to serve. 
Where a trustee is uncooperative and refuses to resign or waive the right to 
serve in the future, further action may be possible.  If a currently serving trustee 
refuses to resign, additional investigation may reflect other grounds for removal.223  
It may also be possible to remove the now undesirable trustee by judicial         
modification of the trust.  Fla. Stat. § 736.04113(1)(b) allows a court to modify or 
change the terms of an irrevocable trust, on the application of any qualified       
beneficiary, if due to “circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, compliance with 
the terms of the trust would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of a 
material purpose of the trust.”  The dissolution of settlor’s marriage may constitute 
an unanticipated change in circumstances.  As settlor is not usually inclined to  
continue to fund a trust in which his or her former spouse’s relatives, friends or 
business associates are the trustees, absent a change in present or future trustees 
under the trust agreement the trust would not be funded and would thus not       
accomplish settlor’s material purposes.224  If a court accepts this argument, it has 
authority to change the trustees designated in the trust agreement.225  Fla. Stat. § 
736.04113 potentially allows the court to change the trustees or other terms of the 
trust, regardless of when the trust was created, and irrespective of objections of a 
trustee or beneficiary to the change, as long as the court finds that the change is not 
inconsistent with settlor’s purpose in creating the trust. Note that a qualified      
beneficiary, rather than the settlor, has standing to institute suit for judicial       
modification of the trust under this statute. 
If the trust was created after December 31, 2000, the rule against perpetuities 
provision set forth in § 689.225(2), Fla. Stat. does not apply to the trust, and if the 
trust does not expressly preclude judicial modification, another basis may also exist 
for judicial modification of an irrevocable trust to change the trustees.226  The court 
has discretion to change the terms of a trust, on the petition of any qualified      
beneficiary, “if compliance with the terms of a trust is not in the best interests of 
the beneficiaries.”227  It would not generally be advantageous to trust beneficiaries 
to have a trust end, depriving them of future benefits, because a settlor now finds 
the trustees unacceptable due to a dissolution of the settlor’s marriage. In an      
  
rather than the grantor, may need to institute this action to appoint a successor trustee.  If no trustee nominated in 
the trust agreement remains, and no charity is a beneficiary of the trust, a trustee may be designated by unanimous 
agreement of all qualified beneficiaries without court action.  Fla. Stat. § 736.0704(3)(b) (2006).  If one or more 
charities are named beneficiaries in the trust, the charities may unanimously select a successor trustee without 
court action. Fla. Stat. § 736.0704(4)(b) (2006). 
 223. See § 736.0706, Fla. Stat. (grounds for removal of a trustee). 
 224. Under common law, material purposes exist when: 1) a trust is a spendthrift trust; 2) the trust postpones 
the right of a beneficiary to receive principal until he reaches a given age; 3) a trust agreement grants the trustee 
discretion with respect to distributions or; 4) the trust is a support trust. 
 225. Fla. Stat. § 736.04113(2)(a) allows the court to “[a]mend or change the terms of the trust, including . . . 
terms governing administration of the trust . . . .” 
 226. Fla. Stat. § 736.04115 (2006). 
 227. Id. 
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appropriate case, this statute should permit the court to modify an irrevocable trust 
to eliminate trustees named and to appoint alternate trustees. 
Where the trustees refuse to resign or waive their rights to serve in the future, 
another alternative is for the parties to cease contributions to the trust, causing the 
insurance to lapse and the trust to terminate. Particularly where the trust was 
funded with term insurance and the insured settlor or settlors remain insurable at 
reasonable cost, this option may be attractive.  In an abundance of caution, a new 
replacement trust should be created, and the new trustee should apply for and    
purchase the life insurance, before policies owned by the prior trust are allowed to 
lapse. 
A second scenario is where one of the divorcing spouses created an irrevocable 
trust, owning insurance on his or her life, and the other spouse is a beneficiary of 
the trust and/or a trustee. The settlor may be agreeable to continuing to fund the 
trust, if and only if the other spouse is eliminated from any participation in the trust 
as trustee or beneficiary.  If both spouses concur, the marital settlement agreement 
may require the spouse named as trustee to resign, or if he or she is named a     
successor trustee, to irrevocably waive his or her right to serve as a trustee in the 
future. The beneficiary spouse may also, by agreement, irrevocably waive all of his 
or her rights to benefits from the trust, accelerating the rights of children or other 
beneficiaries designated in the trust agreement.228 It is more practical to obtain 
these waivers in the dissolution action than to leave the parties with unresolved 
matters and unintended consequences after the divorce. If the tax consequences 
flowing from the beneficiary spouse’s waiver would be unacceptable, the insured 
spouse may wish to consider negotiating to ascertain what benefit might be 
achieved by retaining the trust with provisions for the beneficiary spouse. This is 
especially true if there is considerable value in the policies owned by the trust,  
settlor is no longer insurable or is insurable only at a greater cost, the beneficiary 
spouse is entitled to only income from the trust or benefits are otherwise limited, 
and if the existence of the trust avoids the need for other security to ensure      
payment of alimony. 
A third scenario is where one or more persons other than the divorcing spouses 
created the irrevocable trust and the trust owns insurance on the life of someone 
other than the divorcing spouses. The divorcing spouses are serving as trustees 
now, or are nominated to serve as trustees in the future, or are named trust         
beneficiaries. An example is where grandma created an irrevocable trust owning 
insurance on her life. The policy proceeds are payable to the trust on grandma’s 
death, and the trust owns the policy. In accordance with the terms of the trust, 
grandma’s daughter and son-in-law are currently serving as co-trustees. On  
grandma’s death the trustees are to distribute trust income to daughter for life, then 
 ________________________  
 228. The tax consequences of a waiver by the beneficiary spouse should be carefully considered.          
Depending on the facts, the life insurance policy proceeds may be included in the insured spouse’s federal taxable 
estate if the insured spouse dies within three years after the transfer of the policy to the trust.  Also, the beneficiary 
spouse’s waiver may not be a qualified disclaimer under I.R.C. § 2518, giving rise to further adverse tax        
consequences. 
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income to son-in-law for life, then remainder to grandchildren. Daughter and     
son-in-law are now dissolving their marriage.  Daughter objects to her husband 
continuing to serve as a trustee or being a potential beneficiary of the trust.  The 
settlor of the trust may also object to son-in-law having any further connection with 
the trust, and may refuse to continue contributions to the trust unless his            
participation is terminated.  Depending on the level of cooperation between the 
parties and other facts, various alternatives may be available. 
If son-in-law is agreeable, he may commit in the marital settlement agreement 
to resign as trustee and may waive his rights to receive any future benefit under the 
trust.  While this is the simplest solution it may have adverse tax consequences.  
His resignation as a trustee or his waiver of the right to serve as a trustee in the 
future generally has no tax consequence.  However, his waiver of benefits under 
the trust may not be a qualified disclaimer under I.R.C. § 2518, either due to the 
timing of the waiver or because he receives consideration in the dissolution action 
in exchange for his waiver.  Tax consequences need to be determined before action 
is taken. 
If the son-in-law is not willing to voluntarily resign or to waive his right to 
serve as a trustee, now or in the future, or to waive his rights as a beneficiary,   
judicial modification of the trust may be available.  The daughter, as a trustee or as 
a qualified beneficiary of the trust, may seek judicial modification under § 
736.04113, Fla. Stat., to eliminate all trust provisions relating to son-in-law.  The 
argument justifying relief would be that the divorce is a circumstance settlor did 
not anticipate, and compliance with the terms of the trust would defeat or          
substantially impair a material purpose of the trust.  One potential difficulty with 
this argument is the definition of a material purpose.  Material purposes generally 
include support, spendthrift, postponement of possession and discretion reposed in 
the trustees.  Depending on the terms of the trust agreement, while settlor’s wishes 
may have changed, that may not amount to interference with accomplishment of a 
material purpose.  In the example set forth above, the trustees were not given    
discretion, as trust income was required to be distributed to the daughter and there 
was no provision for distribution of principal to her at all.  Thus, there may be no 
material purpose frustrated.  Had the trust provided instead that income and/or 
principal were to be distributed to the settlor’s daughter in the trustees’ discretion, 
having the daughter’s former spouse serve as trustee would be more likely to    
impair accomplishment of a material purpose.  If a material purpose is impaired, 
the court may change the trust’s terms to eliminate the son-in-law as a trustee and a 
beneficiary,229 or may terminate the trust.230  Both remedies give rise to potential 
tax consequences which must be ascertained before modification is sought. 
An argument may be advanced to support judicial modification of the trust 
based on the best interests of the beneficiaries, if the settlor of the trust is living.  In 
the prior example, daughter, as a qualified beneficiary or as a trustee has standing 
 ________________________  
 229. Fla. Stat. § 736.04113(2)(a) (2006). 
 230. Fla. Stat. § 736.04113(2)(b) (2006). 
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to institute suit.231  To modify the trust under § 736.04115, Fla. Stat., the court must 
consider the interests of all beneficiaries, including the son-in-law, rather than just 
qualified beneficiaries.  However, no beneficiary would appear to benefit if settlor 
will cease funding the trust, causing non-payment of premiums and subsequent 
lapse of insurance, unless son-in-law is removed as a trustee and a beneficiary.  
Under these facts, the proposed modification may be granted.  Note that relief is 
not available under § 736.04115, Fla. Stat., if the trust was created prior to January 
1, 2001, or if the rule against perpetuities provision applicable to the trust requires 
all interests to vest or fail within 21 years of a life in being under § 689.225(2), Fla. 
Stat., or if the trust agreement expressly prohibits judicial modification.232 
A fourth scenario is one in which one or more settlors (other than the parties to 
the dissolution action) created the irrevocable trust, and named in-laws as successor 
trustees and/or future potential beneficiaries.  However, no in-laws are serving as 
trustee currently and no in-laws are currently qualified beneficiaries.  To illustrate, 
grandma created an irrevocable trust naming her daughter as a trustee and daughter 
is currently serving as trustee.  The trust owns a life insurance policy insuring 
grandma’s life.  The first successor trustee is grandma’s son.  The second successor 
trustee nominated in the trust agreement is grandma’s son-in-law. The trust       
provides that the beneficiaries of the trust now and on grandma’s death are son and 
daughter, who shall share equally.  If one of them fails to survive grandma, the 
deceased child’s children (settlor’s grandchildren) share the deceased child’s    
benefits.  Only if the deceased child is not survived by issue does son-in-law     
benefit financially under the terms of the trust agreement.  In that situation judicial 
modification under §§ 736.04113 or 736.04115, Fla. Stat. may be available as   
described above.  But if the settlor is deceased, a further remedy may exist without 
judicial intervention. 
Where judicial modification would be permitted under § 736.04113(2), Fla. 
Stat., and the settlor of the trust is deceased, and the trustee and the qualified     
beneficiaries unanimously agree, the terms of the trust governing distribution and 
administration may be modified by agreement without court action.233              
Modification by unanimous agreement is only available where the trust was created 
after December 31, 2000, the rule against perpetuities set forth in § 689.225(2), Fla. 
Stat. does not apply to the trust or the trust agreement expressly authorizes        
nonjudicial modification, and there is no charitable organization named a          
beneficiary. If a charity is a trust beneficiary, modification by unanimous      
agreement may occur after the charity’s interest in the trust ends.  While the statute 
does not so expressly state, § 736.0412, Fla. Stat. does not permit the trustees and 
qualified beneficiaries to eliminate gifts to other beneficiaries without their       
consent.234 
 ________________________  
 231. Fla. Stat. § 736.04115(1) (2006). 
 232. Fla. Stat. § 736.04115(3) (2006). 
 233. Fla. Stat. § 736.0412 (2006). 
 234. See David F. Powell, The New Florida Trust Code Part I, 80 FLA. B.J. 24 (July/August 2006). 
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Whether settlor is living or deceased, the terms of the trust agreement may 
provide another means of addressing the situation by creation of a further trust, 
known as trust decanting.235  Trust decanting applies where the trust agreement 
gives the trustee absolute power to invade principal of the trust.236  A trustee has 
this absolute power where the trustee may exercise total discretion with respect to 
which beneficiaries receive principal of the trust, without being limited to         
distributing principal based on an ascertainable standard.237  For the trustee to have 
the power within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 736.04117, the trust agreement must 
not expressly deprive the trustee of the right to act.238  Even if a trustee has absolute 
discretion to make principal distributions, if the trust agreement deprives the trustee 
of the power to create new trusts, the trustee may not do so. 
Where the trustee has absolute power to distribute trust principal to one or 
more beneficiaries, and no provision in the trust agreement precludes the trustee 
from creating a further trust, the trustee may transfer principal from the initial trust 
to another trust, including a new trust.  The beneficiaries of the new or second trust 
may not include anyone who was not a beneficiary of the first trust.239  However, 
persons who were beneficiaries of the first trust may be excluded as beneficiaries 
of the second trust.  Thus, the in-law initially named a beneficiary need not be a 
beneficiary of the second trust.240 The statute specifies the procedure to be         
followed to transfer the principal owned by one trust to the second trust, as well as 
the procedure to be followed by a beneficiary who objects to the trustee’s proposed 
decanting.241 
The last statutory method potentially available to revise the terms of an          
irrevocable trust owning life insurance under Florida law is entry into a nonjudicial 
settlement agreement.242  Wherever the court could order judicial modification, all 
persons who would be affected may instead enter into an agreement consenting to 
the change in trust terms.243  At a minimum the interested persons include all trust 
beneficiaries and the current trustee.  However, interested persons may also include 
 ________________________  
 235. David F. Powell, Administration of Trusts in Florida, § 18.14 (2009). 
 236. Fla. Stat. § 736.04117 (2006). 
 237. Fla. Stat. § 736.04117(1)(b) (2006). The statute specifies that, if distributions are only for “health, 
education, maintenance, and support” there is an ascertainable standard and the trustee lacks absolute power.  In 
contrast, where the trustee may distribute or expend trust principal for the “best interests, welfare, comfort, or 
happiness” of one or more beneficiaries, the trustee has absolute power.  The word “absolute” need not be used in 
the trust agreement for the trustee to have absolute power. 
 238. Fla. Stat. § 736.04117(1)(a) (2006). Inclusion in the trust agreement of a spendthrift provision or a 
provision precluding revocation or amendment of the trust does not alone prevent a trustee from acting under the 
statute. Fla. Stat. § 736.04117(5). 
 239. Fla. Stat. § 736.04117(1)(a)(1) (2006). 
 240. There are other restrictions and limitations on the trustee’s right to transfer principal of one trust to 
another trust. The trustee cannot, by his actions, cause a loss of a marital or charitable deduction for federal   
income, gift or estate tax purposes. Fla. Stat. § 736.04117(1)(a)3 (2006). Unless the trust has a charitable       
beneficiary, these limitations are not likely to interfere with trust decanting in the divorce context to exclude  
relatives-in-law from participation in the trust. 
 241. Fla. Stat. § 736.04117(2), (4) (2006). 
 242. Fla. Stat. § 736.0111 (2006). 
 243. Id. Impediments may exist to obtaining consent of all interested persons, particularly where trust  
beneficiaries include unknown, unascertained or unborn beneficiaries, or minor children whose interests differ 
from those of their parents. 
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creditors of the trust, successor trustees named in the trust agreement and others.  
While court approval of the settlement agreement is not required, it may be sought 
on the request of any interested person.244 
The nonjudicial settlement agreement is mentioned herein primarily for the 
sake of completeness.  For several reasons it is unlikely to be the most effective 
method to address trusts owning life insurance in the divorce context. First, it   
requires the consent of many more persons than other alternatives. Second,       
interested persons who would be impacted by an agreement may include unborn or 
unascertained persons. These persons may not be represented245 and it may be   
difficult, impossible or very expensive to obtain their consent. 
The statutes allowing for judicial or nonjudicial modification of an irrevocable 
trust do not supplant or eliminate common law actions for trust reformation.246  
Thus, trust reformation remains a viable solution.  A brief summary of the common 
law of reformation follows. 
Under common law, the question presented generally centered on whether an 
irrevocable trust could be terminated, rather than amended, prior to the time      
specified in the trust agreement.  The law is still instructive, because if the trust 
could be terminated early, the same theory would likely permit amendments.  
Common law, like current statutes, distinguished between judicial and nonjudicial 
action. 
As a general proposition, common law allowed an irrevocable trust to be    
terminated prior to the time specified in the trust agreement on the unanimous   
consent of all trust beneficiaries.247  This was true even over the objection of the 
settlor or the trustee.  However, this rule did not apply if the trust had an unfulfilled 
material purpose.248 
Under common law, one impediment to reformation of an irrevocable trust   
existed where all beneficiaries did not consent to the amendment or were not    
parties to the action in which amendment was agreed to.249  It was held that “an 
irrevocable trust may be amended without the consent of the beneficiary when the 
settlor surrenders privileges or rights in favor of the beneficiary.”250  Under    
common law, a court could revise administrative and distributive provisions of a 
trust, if such action was appropriate to achieve settlor’s purposes, and those      
 ________________________  
 244. Fla. Stat. § 736.0111(5) (2006). 
 245. See Fla. Stat. § 736.0310 (2006) (rules pertaining to representation of persons in the trust context). 
 246. Fla. Stat. § 736.04113(4) (2006) expressly states that the statute’s provisions “are in addition to, and 
not in derogation of, rights under the common law to modify, amend, terminate, or revoke trusts.”  See also Fla. 
Stat. §§ 736.04115(5) and 736.0412(6). 
 247. See White v. Bourne, 9 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1942); Goldentrester v. Richard, 498 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 3d Dist. 
Ct. App. 1986); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65(1) (2003). 
 248. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65(2) (2003). 
 249. Bieley v. Bieley, 398 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).  In that case a couple created an     
irrevocable trust for the benefit of their minor son.  The trust did not own life insurance.  The couple thereafter 
dissolved their marriage.  The trust agreement was purportedly amended in the dissolution action.  The validity of 
the amendment was thereafter questioned, as the parties’ minor son was not a party to the dissolution action and 
did not consent to the trust amendment. 
 250. Id. 
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purposes might otherwise be frustrated due to changed circumstances not          
anticipated by settlor.251 
Where court action is to be taken to modify or reform a trust, a lawsuit separate 
from the dissolution proceeding is required.  Although the circuit court may have 
jurisdiction where the trust has a Florida situs, the parties to the trust action are not 
the same as the parties in the dissolution action. 
As noted throughout this section of the article, it is crucial to appreciate that 
there are potential tax ramifications to any change to an irrevocable trust.  The fact 
that a modification is accomplished by waiver, agreement or court action does not 
guaranty that the change will be respected by the Internal Revenue Service or that 
adverse tax consequences will not result from the change in trust terms. 
V. ENTITLEMENT TO LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS AND REMEDIES ON DEATH 
OF INSURED 
Where the payor of alimony or child support dies while insured, after a petition 
is filed for dissolution or after a final judgment is entered dissolving the insured’s 
marriage, disputes may arise concerning who is entitled to the life insurance 
proceeds, or what remedies exist if the required life insurance is not in effect.   
Disputes may also arise if an insured who was required to maintain life insurance 
for a former spouse or children, even if not to secure alimony or child support, fails 
to do so.  In addition to cases in which the insured failed to name beneficiaries  
consistent with a marital settlement agreement or final judgment of dissolution, 
there are cases in which a deceased insured may have had the right to change the 
beneficiary of life insurance from the former spouse and neglected to do so.      
Litigation may be caused by the failure of the insured to comply with the final 
judgment of dissolution or the marital agreement incorporated therein, either in 
terms of maintaining requisite insurance or naming appropriate beneficiaries, or the 
failure to otherwise adequately account for the insurance in the prior divorce     
action.  The terms of the agreement or judgment affect the outcome.  A review of 
cases in which courts resolved the disputes reflects the importance of wording of 
life insurance provisions in the agreement or judgment,252 and the importance of 
advising a newly divorced insured to promptly attend to any needed changes to the 
beneficiary of life insurance.253  In Florida, divorce does not automatically alter the 
designated beneficiary of a life insurance policy.254 
 ________________________  
 251. Mills v. Ball, 380 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
 252. The wording of the court order or judgment directing the purchase or maintenance of life insurance is 
equally important during the lives of the parties. Disputes arise when the parties cannot understand their        
obligations, or the provisions of an agreement or order are ambiguous.  See. e.g. Lopez v. Lopez, 780 So. 2d 164 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).  In that case the court rejected an order requiring the purchase of a life insurance 
policy “if reasonably available,” because of inadequate wording.  In addition, the order was so poorly drafted that 
the payor spouse could not determine if he was obligated to provide one $250,000.00 policy to assure payment of 
both alimony and child support, or if two separate policies of $250,000.00 were required.  Id. at 165 n.1. 
 253. While the cause may be “oversight, mistake, or poor comprehension of the way . . . life insurance 
policies operate,” because no Florida statute automatically changes or revokes life insurance beneficiary        
designations when an insured’s marriage is dissolved, there is an increased likelihood that a former spouse or 
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Absent the ability of a former spouse or child to collect the life insurance 
proceeds, there may be no effective remedy.  The individual denied rights to the 
policy proceeds may, at best, retain rights as a creditor of the deceased obligor’s 
estate based on breach of contract or other action.  If decedent’s probate estate  
assets (which do not include life insurance proceeds if a beneficiary is named on 
the policy and the beneficiary survives the insured) are insufficient to pay the 
claim, the former spouse or child as a creditor is left without adequate recourse. 
Where in a marital settlement agreement the payor-husband agrees to maintain 
a life insurance policy provided by his employer to secure child support as long as 
his first wife has custody of the minor child, but names payor’s second wife as the 
beneficiary of the policy, on his death his minor child may be entitled to the policy 
proceeds.255  A conclusion favoring the minor child was reached in one case,     
although the employer changed the insurance coverage several times after the 
payor-husband was divorced, the insurance company providing the group term 
coverage changed, and the death benefit increased from $10,000.00 at the time of 
the marital agreement to $20,000.00 at the husband-payor’s death.256 
Vague wording in a marital settlement agreement may preclude such a          
favorable outcome.  In one case the divorcing couple entered into an agreement 
providing for child custody, child support, alimony and property settlement.257  The 
agreement included two critical provisions.  In one provision the husband agreed to 
pay all reasonable college expenses for his children who attended college.  In a 
second provision the husband agreed to keep in effect two life insurance policies.  
His former wife was to be named beneficiary of each policy.  However, if she   
remarried, the husband’s children were to be named beneficiaries of each policy.  
The agreement neglected to specify if the insurance was to secure alimony, child 
support or other obligations, or was part of the property settlement.  The husband 
later died, without paying his children’s college expenses and having not         
maintained the life insurance required under the marital settlement agreement.  
Decedent’s former wife and children, who were then adults, filed claims against his 
estate in an effort to recover the reasonable college expenses owed and an amount 
equal to the proceeds of life insurance decedent failed to maintain.  Decedent’s 
estate objected to the claims.  Due to the absence of clear wording in the marital 
settlement agreement, the court determined that the insurance was merely provided 
as security for child support.258 As decedent apparently paid child support owed 
during his life, there could be no recovery after his death on the security for an 
  
children of a dissolved marriage will remain beneficiaries of a divorced individual’s life insurance at his or her 
death.” Suzanne Soliman, A Fair Presumption, 36 STETSON L. REV. 397 (2007). 
 254. Id. at 410. 
 255. Roxy v. Roxy, 454 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
 256. Id.  The marital agreement did not state the amount of insurance then in existence or to be maintained 
for the benefit of the minor child, nor did it limit the policy proceeds payable to the child for child support owed as 
of the payor’s death.  Thus, the court declined to limit the share of the policy proceeds to which the child was 
entitled.  The court noted that the deceased insured’s surviving spouse had not paid any premiums, implying that 
had she done so the outcome may have been different. 
 257. Mitchell v. Combank/Winter Park, 429 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
 258. Id. at 1321-22. 
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obligation fulfilled.  The children had no remedy for the deceased father’s failure to 
keep life insurance in effect.   
The right to recover proceeds of a life insurance policy paid at death of the    
insured parent liable for child support, when the insurance was required by the 
court to secure payment of child support and the order was not complied with, is 
generally based on one of two legal theories.  The children may sue the deceased 
parent’s estate for breach of contract, as the children are third party beneficiaries of 
the marital settlement agreement.259  If the deceased parent’s estate does not own 
sufficient assets, it may be more advantageous to sue the named beneficiary or  
other recipient of the proceeds in equity for imposition of a constructive trust.260  
To proceed successfully on either theory, the plaintiff needs to identify the policy 
purchased and maintained by the deceased parent, or owned by the parent obligated 
to pay child support at the time of the dissolution of marriage.261  Absent proof 
identifying the specific policy owned or to be purchased or maintained, an        
adequate remedy may not be available.262 
To succeed in imposing a constructive trust on policy proceeds, where despite 
a court order requiring maintenance of life insurance to secure child support the 
insured parent named another beneficiary, proof of either fraud, undue influence, 
abuse of confidence or mistake, and proof that it would be inequitable to unjustly 
enrich the named beneficiary are needed.263  The wrongdoing or mistake may be 
that of the beneficiary or of  the insured policy owner.264  The deceased insured’s 
 ________________________  
 259. Harris v. Byard, 501 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Lowry v. Lowry, 463 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 260. Harris, 501 So. 2d at 730. 
 261. Id.; see also Homes v. Holmes, 463 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985), where the final judgment 
of dissolution merely required the husband to maintain life insurance on his life and to designate his minor child 
beneficiary. Evidence was offered that the husband owned a $25,000.00 life insurance policy at the time of    
dissolution of the marriage.  Both the child’s mother and her divorce attorney testified that the policy existed and 
was the policy referenced in the final judgment. 
 262. Harris v. Byard, 501 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987).  In that case a husband and wife who 
had two minor children together divorced. The final judgment of dissolution of their marriage required the     
husband to maintain life insurance naming the minor children beneficiaries. The final judgment did not reflect 
whether the husband owned life insurance, and no specific amount of insurance to be purchased or maintained was 
specified.  The record did not indicate the purchase of life insurance by the former husband to fulfill his obligation, 
or any action by the former wife during his life to compel him to do so.  At the time of the former husband’s death 
he had seven minor children, five of whom were born out of wedlock.  An employer provided a group term life 
insurance policy that was in effect at the former husband’s death provided $12,000.00 in proceeds.  The former 
husband named his mother primary beneficiary of the policy and did not name an alternate beneficiary.  His  
mother predeceased him.  At his demise multiple parties claimed rights to the proceeds.  Decedent’s former wife 
claimed the policy proceeds to pay child support owed to her children. Decedent’s sister claimed the policy 
proceeds were payable to decedent’s estate, entitling her to apply them to decedent’s funeral bill.  Decedent’s 
sister further claimed the remaining proceeds were payable equally to all seven children.  Id. at 731.  The court 
declined to award the insurance proceeds to decedent’s former spouse to pay child support for decedent’s two 
legitimate children.  The court found “there was no proof that a particular insurance policy was in existence at the 
time of the divorce to provide the necessary specificity and meaning to the otherwise ambiguous and indefinite 
provisions of the dissolution judgment.”  Id. at 734.  Furthermore, “the lack of an existing policy at the time of 
dissolution deprives this case of any specific property interest in which the court could create an equitable interest 
or constructive trust.”  Id. Absent adequate specific provisions in the prior final judgment of dissolution         
identifying the policy to be used to secure child support or proof that payor owned the policy in question at the 
time of dissolution, the proceeds were general estate assets.  The court thus ruled in favor of decedent’s sister. 
 263. Homes v. Holmes, 463 So. 2d at 580 (quoting Wadlington v. Edwards, 92 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1957)). 
 264. Homes, 463 So. 2d at 580. 
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failure to adhere to the court order and name the minor child policy beneficiary has 
been construed as either a mistake or a breach of confidence.265 
Cases reflect imposition of a constructive trust, where decedent failed to       
designate a policy beneficiary as required in a final judgment or marital settlement 
agreement.  However, this remedy may not be available where the recipient of the 
policy proceeds at the insured’s death purchased the policy for valuable             
consideration266 or paid premiums to keep the policy in force, as opposed to one 
who was merely designated a beneficiary gratuitously by the deceased insured. 
In disputes between a deceased insured’s former spouse or children against a 
surviving spouse about rights to life insurance proceeds, where the insured        
voluntarily agreed to maintain insurance for the former spouse and/or children and 
no purpose to secure support was stated, unless the insured’s surviving spouse paid 
policy premiums, the former spouse or children are likely to prevail.  Where the 
property settlement agreement incorporated into a final judgment of dissolution 
requires one parent to maintain life insurance, remain the owner of life insurance 
and name his children beneficiaries, the insurance is not specified as merely      
security for child support, and the parent owns and pays all premiums on a term 
insurance policy until his death, the children may have vested rights in the policy 
proceeds.267  In that situation, the insured loses rights to change the beneficiary 
after the final judgment of dissolution.  Where the insured improperly attempts to 
change the beneficiary, the designation is of no effect and the newly named      
beneficiary acquires no rights to policy proceeds.268  Although from the insurance 
company’s documents the insured former spouse technically remains the owner of 
the policy, the courts’ view is that the provisions of the agreement are tantamount 
 ________________________  
 265. Id.  In Holmes a husband and wife had one minor child.  At the time of their divorce the husband 
owned a $25,000.00 life insurance policy on his life.  The parties signed an agreement incorporated into the final 
judgment of dissolution, in which the court ordered the husband to maintain life insurance on his life and to   
designate his minor child as beneficiary.  Id. at 579.  Three weeks before entry of the final judgment of dissolution, 
the husband changed the beneficiary of the $25,000.00 policy to his sister.  When the former husband died five 
months later, both his sister and his minor daughter claimed rights to the policy proceeds.  The court was not 
persuaded by decedent’s sister’s unsupported assertion that decedent owned a second $2,000.00 policy on his life, 
or the evidence she presented to establish that decedent purchased a life insurance policy on his minor daughter’s 
life of which she became owner and beneficiary on her father’s death.  The court held that either decedent made a 
mistake or he abused a confidence, and unjust enrichment would result if decedent’s sister received the policy 
proceeds.  Decedent’s minor daughter was entitled to the policy proceeds. 
 266. See Lowry, 463 So. 2d at 542, where the court held that the deceased insured’s children stated a cause 
of action by asserting that incident to dissolution of their parents’ marriage their father agreed to keep a 
$40,000.00 life insurance policy in force for their benefit, he instead named his second wife beneficiary of the 
policy, and his second wife was not a bona fide purchaser for value.  See also Cadore v. Cadore, 67 So. 2d 635 
(Fla. 1953). 
 267. Pensyl v. Moore, 415 So. 2d 771, 773 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).  Although the deceased insured 
was the owner of the policy on insurance documents, the court held that the children owned the policy as of the 
insured’s death.  Id. 
 268. Id.  In that case a husband entered a property settlement agreement incident to his divorce requiring 
him to “maintain and remain the owner of all life insurance policies on his life with the minor children . . . as the 
direct or indirect beneficiaries thereof.”  Id. at 772.  After the divorce the former husband personally paid all 
premiums to keep the policy in force.  Despite the agreement, the former husband thereafter signed a new      
beneficiary designation naming his girlfriend the primary policy beneficiary and his children alternate            
beneficiaries.  On his death the minor children and decedent’s girlfriend both asserted claims to the proceeds.  The 
appellate court affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the children.  Id. at 773. 
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to a gift of the policy to the former spouse or children required to be designated 
beneficiaries “divesting the decedent of ownership interest in the life insurance 
policy and creating in the beneficiary an indefeasible interest in the proceeds.”269 
In determining whether the former spouse or child required to be designated 
beneficiary of a life insurance policy is entitled to the proceeds on the death of the 
insured when not designated beneficiary on the policy, the courts consider a variety 
of factors.  These include the wording of the marital settlement agreement, order 
requiring insurance and final judgment of dissolution; who retained physical     
possession of the policy or other proof of insurance; whether the insurance      
company was notified of the terms of dissolution;  the type of insurance (such as 
term insurance or whole life insurance); who paid premiums; whether the          
beneficiary to be named acquired vested rights in the policy and/or proceeds;  and 
what rights the insured policy owner retained.  Decisions do not always favor the 
beneficiary required to be so named in the final judgment of dissolution. 
Although a marital settlement agreement with his first wife incorporated into a 
final judgment of dissolution required a father to name his three children equal 
beneficiaries of his existing life insurance policy insuring his life, his second wife 
was entitled to the policy proceeds on his death as the beneficiary designated on the 
policy.270  Following his divorce, the father married his second wife, and named her 
beneficiary on his life insurance despite the terms of the final judgment of         
dissolution.271  The second wife was given physical possession of the policy and 
she paid the premiums due to keep the policy in force.272  On the insured’s death, 
both his widow and his three children from his first marriage claimed entitlement 
 ________________________  
 269. Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 2008 WL 1886032 (M.D. Fla. 2008).  In Moore, a husband and wife 
executed a property settlement agreement in connection with their divorce.  The husband owned a term life   
insurance policy on his life paying $40,000.00 on his death.  In the property settlement agreement the husband 
promised to name his wife a 50% beneficiary and his three daughters equal beneficiaries of the other 50% of the 
policy proceeds.  He thereafter remarried, named his new wife the policy beneficiary and died.  Summary      
judgment was granted to the former spouse and decedent’s three daughters, entitling them to the policy proceeds.  
See also Dixon v. Dixon, 184 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).  Mr. Dixon was married and divorced 
twice prior to his death.  He had two daughters with his first wife and one son with his second wife.  All three 
minor children survived him.  There was no marital settlement agreement entered in Mr. Dixon’s second divorce.  
Instead, the court ordered him to keep in effect all life insurance on his life provided by his employer, and to name 
his minor son the beneficiary. Although the insurance company providing group term life insurance at Mr.    
Dixon’s employment changed between his second divorce and his death, life insurance on his life remained in 
effect at his death.  Contrary to the court’s order, Mr. Dixon never named his son policy beneficiary.  Following 
the dissolution of marriage his second wife was named beneficiary and had physical possession of the life     
insurance certificates.  Mr. Dixon later designated his brother as policy beneficiary.  After his demise a dispute 
arose when the second former spouse claimed the policy proceeds for her minor son under the prior court decree 
and decedent’s brother claimed the proceeds by virtue of the beneficiary designation form.  The court held that 
decedent’s minor son was entitled to the policy proceeds, as “the terms of the stipulation were so encompassing as 
to amount to a surrender of the essential incidents of ownership.”  Id. at 480.  The court found that decedent’s son 
acquired a vested interest in the policy proceeds under the divorce decree, precluding decedent from validly  
changing the policy beneficiary. 
 270. Cadore v. Cadore, 67 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1953).  At the time of his divorce, the father and his first wife 
had three children, two of whom were minors.  The insurance policy was not expressly stated to be security for 
child support, and all three children were adults at the time of their father’s death. 
 271. Id. at 637. 
 272. Id. 
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to the policy proceeds.273  The insured owner did not give up the right to change the 
owner or beneficiary of the policy, he was not, in the divorce judgment, required to 
irrevocably designate his children as beneficiaries, he did not forfeit the right to 
cancel the policy, borrow against the policy or allow the policy to lapse, he was not 
even required to maintain the policy, and his second wife paid premiums and    
retained physical possession of the policy.  The agreement only required him to 
name his children beneficiaries and was read literally by the court to require    
nothing further.  These facts caused the court to conclude that the children did not 
acquire vested interests in the policy, and decedent’s widow was entitled to the 
insurance proceeds.274 
The instruction gleaned from the cases is that provisions pertaining to life     
insurance in a marital settlement agreement and a final judgment of dissolution 
must be clear, specific and detailed.  If the policy is to be maintained in effect and 
premiums are to be timely paid by one former spouse, this must be stated.  Whether 
the policy is maintained to secure payment of alimony, to secure payment of child 
support, is lump sum alimony or is part of a property settlement should be stated.  
Every right retained to the insured owner or denied to him or her should be set 
forth.  It is not adequate to merely state who is to be named beneficiary, without 
specifying if that beneficiary designation is irrevocable, or if it is revocable when 
and on what terms it may be changed.  Who is to notify the insurance company 
issuing the policy of the restrictions should be set forth, in addition to how each 
interested party will receive notice of any changes related to the insurance,        
attempts to change the owner or beneficiary of the policy or to borrow against or 
pledge the policy, failure to pay premiums or other relevant events.  Other terms to 
consider including in the pertinent divorce documents are whether the beneficiary 
is acquiring a vested interest in the policy, and how future spouses of the insured 
are to be notified of the restrictions applicable to the policy prior to marriage.  
Where the details about the policy are known, such as the identity of the company 
issuing the policy, the policy number and the date of issuance, as many details as 
possible identifying the policy should be included in the marital settlement   
agreement, order or judgment of dissolution. 
Including detailed provisions in the final judgment of dissolution, as suggested 
above, is not only important to protect the rights of the beneficiary designated in 
the divorce documents against another beneficiary designated by decedent or if 
none, against the decedent’s probate estate.  The policy beneficiary designated by 
decedent may or may not be a later spouse.  The decedent’s surviving spouse, 
 ________________________  
 273. Id.  Although the policy was in the sum of $3,000.00, double benefits were payable due to the insured’s 
death in an accident. 
 274. Id. at 638.  In reaching its conclusion, the court examined many rights the insured owner had under the 
policy and general insurance law.  These included the right to retain and transfer possession of the policy, the right 
to transfer and assign the policy, the right to pledge the policy as collateral and to change the beneficiary.  Neither 
the marital settlement agreement nor the final judgment of dissolution purported to deny the insured owner any of 
these rights. 
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where one exists, may claim policy proceeds either as a named beneficiary or 
against a named beneficiary under Florida’s elective share law.275 
The elective share entitles a decedent’s surviving spouse to a sum equal to  
thirty percent of decedent’s elective estate.276  Included in the elective estate is a 
“decedent’s beneficial interest in the net cash surrender value immediately before 
death of any policy of insurance on the decedent’s life.”277  Term insurance is thus 
generally excluded from the elective estate as it has no cash value.  The proceeds of 
life insurance on decedent’s life in excess of the net cash surrender value are   
likewise excluded from the elective estate.278  Also excluded from the elective  
estate are “[a]ny policy of insurance on decedent’s life maintained pursuant to 
court order”279 and “[a]ny transfer of property by the decedent to the extent the 
decedent received adequate consideration in money or money’s worth for the  
transfer.”280  Absent proper wording in the divorce documents, the deceased      
insured’s surviving spouse may be able to include a policy’s cash surrender value 
in the elective estate, asserting that a vested interest was not transferred by        
decedent, the transfer was not for valuable consideration, or that the policy is not 
maintained pursuant to court order. 
Whether a deceased insured transferred a vested interest in life insurance in a 
divorce is also important, because if an irrevocable transfer occurred before      
decedent’s marriage to the surviving spouse, neither the cash surrender value of the 
policy nor the death benefit are included in the elective estate.281  If any portion of 
the insurance proceeds (including cash surrender value) is included in the elective 
estate, it may be payable to the surviving spouse in satisfaction of the elective 
share.282 
Where a marital settlement agreement requires one spouse to provide life      
insurance to secure alimony, and to name the alimony recipient as the beneficiary, 
the payor may fail to do so.  Where on the payor’s death his revocable trust is the 
owner and beneficiary of the policy, the former spouse receiving alimony may 
nevertheless be entitled to the life insurance proceeds.283  Similarly, where the final 
judgment of dissolution required a husband to name the family trust as beneficiary 
of a $110,000.00 life insurance policy and he failed to do so, on his death the    
remedy of a constructive trust was available to his former spouse.284  After the  
dissolution of his marriage the insured surrendered his life insurance, and replaced 
it with new policies paying $150,000.00 on his death to his second wife.285  Yet his 
will stated that he left no gift for his children born of his first marriage, because 
 ________________________  
 275. Fla. Stat. § 732.2101 et. seq. (2006). 
 276. Fla. Stat. § 732.2065 (2006). 
 277. Fla. Stat. § 732.2035(6) (2006). 
 278. Fla. Stat. § 732.2045(1)(d) (2006). 
 279. Fla. Stat. § 732.2045(1)(e) (2006). 
 280. Fla. Stat. § 732.2045(1)(b) (2006). 
 281. Fla. Stat. § 732.2045(1)(a) (2006). 
 282. Fla. Stat. § 732.2075 (2006). 
 283. Vaughn v. Vaughn, 741 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 284. Blaney v. McCluskey, 529 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).  The opinion did not reflect 
whether the insurance was required to secure alimony or child support or was for another purpose. 
 285. Id. 
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their mother was the beneficiary of life insurance on his life.  He then died with no 
life insurance payable to his former spouse or the family trust.286 The court        
recognized that an action for constructive trust was stated, as there was either an 
abuse of confidence or mistake by decedent, and a need to avoid unjust enrichment 
of the surviving spouse who received and could otherwise retain the life insurance 
proceeds.287 
In a common situation, in the dissolution of marriage the court orders one 
spouse to maintain life insurance to secure payment of alimony.  In violation of the 
final judgment, the payor former spouse instead names his or her subsequent 
spouse beneficiary.  On the insured’s death litigation ensues when both the former 
spouse and the surviving spouse claim entitlement to the life insurance policy 
proceeds.288  An action for constructive trust may provide a remedy for the former 
spouse who is denied insurance proceeds.289 
The wording of a court order requiring life insurance, as well as the type of 
policy involved, the owner of the policy, and the insured’s rights in the policy all 
may impact entitlement to proceeds on the insured’s death. Whether the life      
insurance was solely ordered by the court, or was also agreed to in a marital      
settlement agreement, was to secure alimony or child support and if so whether 
unpaid support is owed and the wording of any order or agreement, affect the   
outcome. 
In one case the court ordered in a final judgment of dissolution of marriage that 
the husband maintain life insurance already in effect and name his minor children 
beneficiaries of the proceeds.290  The insurance was provided by the husband’s 
employer, and the employer was the policy holder.291  The insured had the right to 
convert the group term insurance to an individual policy if his employment ended 
or if the employer ceased providing the insurance, and the right to change the   
beneficiary of the policy.292  The insured was not the owner of the policy, and did 
not have the rights to assign, gift or change the owner of the policy, as the owner 
was at all times his employer.293  Only the husband, or his employer, paid the   
premiums due.294  Despite the court’s order, the husband never named his children 
beneficiaries of the policy.  Instead, he designated his second spouse as             
 ________________________  
 286. Id. 
 287. Id.  To state a cause of action for constructive trust the surviving former spouse must assert that, in this 
context, allowing someone other than the former spouse, child or other recipient designated in the final judgment 
of dissolution to collect the life insurance proceeds would cause unjust enrichment to the policy beneficiary, and 
the unjust enrichment resulted from fraud, undue influence, abuse of confidence or mistake.  Abuse of confidence 
or mistake by the deceased former spouse is adequate to support the imposition of a constructive trust.  Decedent’s 
mistaken belief that he, at death, would own life insurance on which his former spouse was designated beneficiary 
was a sufficient mistake. As the issue in Blaney was whether the trial court improperly dismissed the former 
spouse’s complaint, the court did not address whether a constructive trust should actually be imposed. 
 288. See Gartley v. Gartley, 662 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Vath v. Vath, 432 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).  At the time of dissolution the husband’s 
mother was the named beneficiary of the policy. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
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beneficiary. When the first wife learned of her husband’s failure to comply with the 
final judgment, she instituted contempt proceedings. The matter was not            
resolved in these proceedings due to the husband’s death.  Both the first wife, on 
behalf of the two minor children, and the husband’s surviving spouse claimed   
entitlement to the life insurance proceeds.295  Because the policy was by its terms 
not assignable, no third party paid premiums, and decedent failed to comply with 
the court order to both name his children beneficiaries and to maintain the policy 
for their benefit, the children were entitled to the policy proceeds in equity.296 
Similarly, where a marital settlement agreement entered in connection with a 
divorce required the husband to keep in force $40,000.00 of life insurance he    
already owned and to designate his minor children irrevocable beneficiaries, the 
children were third party beneficiaries of the agreement.297  When the husband 
failed to comply with the agreement and instead named his widow beneficiary, his 
children remained entitled to the policy proceeds at his death.298  This was true 
although the children were adults at the time of their father’s death, the policy was 
not required to secure child support, and despite the assertion by the surviving  
widow that she did nothing wrong.  Even absent facts establishing wrongdoing by 
the widow, she would have been unjustly enriched by her deceased husband’s 
wrongful conduct were the court to award her the life insurance policy proceeds.299 
Where life insurance is mandated for child support in a final judgment, as    
opposed to in a marital settlement agreement, and the payor neglects to maintain 
the insurance and dies, the ability of the child to recover is uncertain.  In one case 
the judgment required a father to maintain a $100,000.00 life insurance policy  
insuring his life, naming the minor child as irrevocable beneficiary.300  The father 
died owning no $100,000.00 policy and no other policy on which the minor child 
was a named beneficiary.  There was in effect at his death a $95,000.00 policy  
provided by his employer, on which his second wife was named beneficiary.  The 
minor child’s mother (decedent’s first wife) sought to impose a constructive trust 
on the proceeds of the $95,000.00 policy.  The appellate court recognized that a 
constructive trust might be an appropriate remedy, but remanded the case for    
further consideration of the equities, in light of the social security benefits the   
minor child was receiving due to his father’s death.301 
While it is preferable for a court order or a marital settlement agreement to 
clearly identify each policy an insured is required to keep in force, failure to do is 
not fatal to a claim of the beneficiary designated in the order or agreement where 
evidence is available to prove the identity of the policy.  In one case a marital   
settlement agreement required the husband to designate his minor children        
 ________________________  
 295. Id.  Due to the conflicting claims, the insurance company commenced an interpleader action. 
 296. Vath, 432 So. 2d at 809.  The holding was based on “application of the maxim that equity regards as 
done that which ought to be done.”  Id. 
 297. Lowry v. Lowry, 463 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Browning v. Browning, 784 So. 2d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).  The policy was stated to 
be additional child support rather than security for payment of child support. 
 301. Id. at 1148-49. 
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irrevocable beneficiaries of his existing life insurance.302  There was no mention of 
the life insurance serving as security for child support and no further information in 
the agreement about the policy.303  Extrinsic evidence reflected that at the time the 
agreement was entered, the husband was insured by an employer provided group 
term insurance policy paying $32,000.00 on his demise.304  The insured paid all 
premiums to keep the policy in effect, named his new wife beneficiary contrary to 
the agreement, and by the time of his death the policy proceeds increased to 
$63,261.00.305  Due to the wording of the agreement, the court found that the  
children had an ownership interest in the policy, entitling them to all proceeds  
remaining at decedent’s death, including the increase in death benefits since the 
date of dissolution of decedent’s marriage.306 
Disputes about entitlement to life insurance proceeds after the insured former 
spouse dies are not limited to situations in which, whether by court order or  
agreement, the insurance was required to secure child support or alimony.  These 
disputes also arise where the policy proceeds constitute lump sum alimony or   
marital property divided in the divorce proceedings.307 
Where the life insurance policy is provided through an employee welfare    
benefit plan or other type of plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), and on the employee’s death the beneficiary designation in 
effect conflicts with provisions in a prior divorce agreement or decree, a three step 
analysis is required to determine who receives policy proceeds.308  As explained by 
one court faced with this situation, 
Initially, the Court must decide whether ERISA’s anti-alienation 
provision, specifically 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), applies to a life   
insurance policy.  Courts generally agree the provision does not 
apply . . . .  The next step in the analysis concerns federal   
preemption. The circuit courts addressing the issue of whether 
state or federal law determines the true beneficiary of the policy 
are split.  If federal law applies, the Court must determine whether 
 ________________________  
 302. Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 781 F. 2d 1494, 1495 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 303. Id. at 1496. 
 304. Id. at 1495. 
 305. Id. at 1496. 
 306. Id. at 1497.  Decedent’s widow, who was named beneficiary of the policy, unsuccessfully argued that 
the children should only receive $32,000.00 of the policy proceeds which was equal to the death benefit existing 
when the marital settlement agreement was entered.  She was also unsuccessful in her argument that the agreement 
failed to sufficiently identify the policy from which the children were to receive benefits.  The court held that the 
general wording of the agreement required the children to benefit from all life insurance decedent owned at the 
time of his divorce. 
 307. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1999).  In Williams, the    
husband of the divorced couple was covered by $51,500.00 in life insurance through the employee welfare benefit 
plan provided by his employer, General Motors.  In the marital settlement agreement incorporated into the final 
judgment of dissolution, as part of the property settlement, the wife was to be the beneficiary of the life insurance.  
After the divorce was final and prior to his death, the former husband designated another beneficiary on the policy.  
Following the former husband’s death, both his former wife and the designated beneficiary claimed entitlement to 
the policy proceeds. 
 308. Id. at 1138-39. 
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the state court order designating the beneficiary is a Qualified  
Domestic Relations Order (QDRO), as defined by ERISA.  If a  
valid QDRO, the Court must finally resolve the competing claims 
to the life insurance proceeds. (footnote omitted)309 
When life insurance is owned in a plan governed by ERISA, the marital       
settlement agreement is generally preempted by ERISA.310  Under this general rule 
the beneficiary named on the policy, rather than the beneficiary who should have 
been named according to the marital settlement agreement, receives the life      
insurance policy proceeds.  An exception to the general rule applies if the final 
judgment of dissolution qualifies as a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) 
under ERISA.311 
A final judgment of dissolution of marriage qualifies as a QDRO 
under ERISA if it sets forth: 
(i)  the name and last known mailing address (if any) of the       
participant and the name and mailing address of each alternate 
payee covered by the order, 
(ii)  the amount or percentage of the participant’s benefits to be 
paid by the plan to each such alternate payee, or the manner in 
which such amount or percentage is to be determined, 
(iii)  the number of payments or period to which such order        
applies, and 
(iv)  each plan to which such order applies.312 
“The standard in evaluating whether a state judgment meets the requirements 
for QDRO status is a flexible one.”313  If a court determines that the final judgment 
of dissolution qualifies as a QDRO after considering any marital settlement  
 ________________________  
 309. Id. at 1348-49.  29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) provides “each pension plan shall provide that benefits     
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”  This is the anti-alienation provision referred to by the 
court as not applicable to life insurance. 
 310. Williams, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1351; see Suzanne Soliman, A Fair Presumption, 36 STETSON L. REV. 397, 
410-13 (2007). 
 311. See Williams, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1351, in which the court held that the QDRO exception applied to all 
ERISA plans, including not only pension plans but also welfare plans. 
 312. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C); Williams, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1352. 
 313. Williams, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1352.  In that case, even though neither the participant’s nor the spouse’s 
address were expressly set forth in the final judgment of dissolution, the court held that the judgment qualified as a 
QDRO.  This was based on the facts that the agreement, which was incorporated into the final judgment, reflected 
an address of real property to be transferred to the wife in the divorce, that real property was in fact the wife’s 
residence despite the failure of the agreement to explicitly so state, and the addresses of the participant and his 
former wife could have been “obtained from the [plan] administrator’s records, from the state court records, or 
from . . . the attorney who prepared the Agreement and whose address and telephone number appear in the 
Agreement.”  Id. at 1353. 
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agreement incorporated therein, the court then reaches the question of entitlement 
to the life insurance proceeds from the plan.  State law governs this analysis.314 
A party who obtains a final judgment mandating the purchase and maintenance 
of life insurance by a former spouse should take steps to assure that the judgment is 
promptly complied with. Delay in purchasing insurance may result in a loss of  
benefits. This could occur where the spouse, required to purchase insurance,     
becomes ill and uninsurable after entry of the judgment and prior to purchase of the 
policy.  Benefits may also be lost after the policy is purchased.  Where a husband 
delayed purchasing mandated life insurance for four years after entry of the final 
judgment of dissolution, and he thereafter committed suicide, no insurance benefits 
or other sums were recoverable by his former wife.315  Had the former wife 
promptly instituted contempt proceedings when the husband initially delayed, she 
might have hastened the purchase of the policy causing the two year                  
uncontestability clause to have expired prior to the husband’s death. 
Enforcement of a requirement to maintain life insurance when a former spouse 
fails to do so may be by civil or criminal contempt.316  When the former payor 
spouse willfully or intentionally fails to obtain insurance or pay premiums, the 
court order should specify if the payor is guilty of civil or criminal contempt.317  
The purpose of civil contempt is generally to benefit the injured former spouse or 
child.  In contrast, the goal of criminal contempt is to punish the wrongdoer.318  For 
a civil contempt order to be valid, the errant payor must have an opportunity to 
perform and provide the insurance to avoid the contempt.319  Before the former 
spouse may be held in criminal contempt, due process requirements and Fla. R. 
 ________________________  
 314. Id.  Because the former wife’s rights to the life insurance proceeds were part of her property settlement 
and were vested, she prevailed over a subsequently designated beneficiary. 
 315. Terry v. Terry, 788 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).  The final judgment of dissolution 
required the husband to purchase $250,000.00 in life insurance to secure payment of child support and an      
additional $250,000.00 in life insurance to secure payment of alimony.  Following his suicide within two years of 
purchasing the insurance, the insurance company declined to pay any proceeds. The former wife then             
unsuccessfully sought imposition of a constructive trust on another life insurance policy purchased for the     
husband’s second wife, retirement plan benefits on which the second wife was named beneficiary, and a residence 
owned by the second wife.  Because the first wife failed to pursue remedies available to her in a timely manner, 
and decedent’s second wife did not benefit from decedent’s actions, the first wife was denied an equitable remedy.  
Id. at 1131. 
 316. Berlow v. Berlow, 21 So. 3d 81 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).  In Berlow, after the divorce was final, 
the former spouses entered into an agreement requiring the former husband to obtain a $1,000,000.00 irrevocable 
term life insurance policy on his life naming the former wife as beneficiary.  The divorce was final in 1994, the 
agreement was entered into in June 2006, and the life insurance was to be purchased within 90 days.  When the 
former husband failed to obtain the insurance, the former wife filed first a motion to compel and then a motion for 
contempt.  After the second order was entered holding the former husband in contempt he produced an accidental 
death and dismemberment policy, rather than a life insurance policy.  The wife persisted and filed a third motion, 
resulting in an order granting the former husband an additional 60 days to purchase the correct insurance.  Rather 
than doing so, the former husband designated the former wife as beneficiary of an existing $500,000.00 life   
insurance policy.  On the wife’s fourth motion, a further motion for contempt, the judge finally granted the relief 
requested.  The order entered did not specify if the contempt was civil or criminal, required the former husband to 
pay a $5,000.00 fine, and included a no purge provision.  Hence, the order was defective and was overturned on 
appeal. 
 317. Id. at 83. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
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Crim. P. 3.840 must be strictly complied with.320  Compelling compliance with 
court ordered life insurance requirements may pose a considerable challenge. 
Cases reflect that, if the payor wishes to limit the circumstances in which life 
insurance proceeds will be used to pay alimony or child support, appropriate     
specific provisions are required to be inserted in the marital settlement agreement 
and/or final judgment.  These provisions might include limiting the use of life   
insurance policy proceeds to pay only sums owed as of the payor spouse’s death, 
and limiting the proceeds to be applied in this fashion to the amount of death    
benefit in effect at the time the agreement or final judgment is entered. 
Disputes also arise where the marital settlement agreement and final judgment 
do not reference life insurance owned by or insuring one spouse.  The agreement or 
judgment may be completely silent, may include general provisions allowing each 
spouse to retain all assets in his or her name not specifically mentioned, or may 
include waivers of rights to the former spouse’s assets without itemizing the assets.  
The failure to explicitly address life insurance may result in further litigation when 
one former spouse dies, particularly if the surviving former spouse is still named a 
beneficiary of the life insurance.  The outcomes of litigation focus in the wording 
of the marital settlement agreement, exactly what the surviving former spouse 
waived, and timing of the purchase of the life insurance. 
If life insurance is not specifically designated in the marital settlement    
agreement or final judgment as separate property of one former spouse, and the 
agreement includes a general waiver of rights to the other spouse’s property, even 
if the waiver is interpreted to include rights to life insurance proceeds, the         
surviving former spouse generally still receives the insurance proceeds if the    
former spouse is the designated policy beneficiary.321  While the surviving spouse 
 ________________________  
 320. Id. 
 321. Cooper v. Muccitelli, 682 So. 2d 77, 79 (Fla. 1996).  While married, a husband owned two life     
insurance policies on his life.  He named his spouse primary beneficiary on both policies, and named his sister 
alternate beneficiary on one policy.  Thereafter the husband and wife divorced pursuant to a written separation 
agreement.  The agreement included the following pertinent provisions: 
Whereas, the parties desire to settle their financial, property and other rights and obligations 
arising out of the marriage and otherwise 
* * * * 
6.  Mutual Release and Discharge of Claims in Estates.  Each party shall have the right to 
dispose of the property of such party by last will and testament in such manner as such party 
may deem proper in the sole discretion of such party, with the same force and effect as if the 
other party had died.  Each party, individually and for his or her heirs, personal                
representatives, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, hereby waives, releases 
and relinquishes any and all claims, rights or interests as a surviving spouse in or to any 
property, real or personal, which the other party owns or possesses at death, or to which the 
other party or his or her estate may be entitled. 
7.  Mutual Release of General Claims.  Except as expressly provided in this Agreement, 
each party hereby waives, releases and discharges all claims, causes of action, rights or   
demands, known or unknown, past, present or future, which he or she now or hereinafter 
has, might have, or could claim to have against the other by reason of any matter, thing or 
cause whatever, prior to the date of this Agreement.  Nothing in this Article 6 shall be 
deemed to prevent either party from enforcing the terms of this Agreement or form asserting 
any rights or claims expressly reserved to either party in this Agreement.  Nothing herein 
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may have, by general language in a marital agreement, waived rights to an        
insurance policy or the proceeds thereof, the insured former spouse who owned the 
policy retained the right to designate a beneficiary of his or her selection.322  By 
failing to remove the former spouse as policy beneficiary, the insured former 
spouse exercised that right.  The surviving former spouse thus remains entitled to 
the policy proceeds on the insured’s death.323 
A marital settlement agreement or final judgment which sets forth distribution 
of specific assets other than insurance may then include generic language.  In one 
case the agreement stated that after delivery of specific assets “neither party hereto 
shall have any claims on the other party of any kind whatsoever”.324  The insured 
former husband died not quite three months after the final judgment of dissolution 
was entered.  At his death he owned life insurance on his life on which his former 
spouse was still named the beneficiary.  Both his former spouse and his estate 
claimed entitlement to the life insurance proceeds.325 While divorce does not     
automatically change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy insuring one spouse, 
it is possible for an appropriate agreement to constitute a waiver of a beneficiary’s 
rights under a policy.326  A marital settlement agreement, like any other contract, is 
to be interpreted by its terms, and extrinsic evidence is only admissible if there is 
an ambiguity.327  In light of the wording of the agreement, the court found an    
ambiguity existed precluding summary judgment in favor of the former wife.328  
Further litigation was needed to ascertain whether the parties intended the marital 
settlement agreement to operate as a waiver of rights to life insurance proceeds.329 
Even if future ownership by one or both spouses of insurance policies on their 
respective lives is expressly provided for in a marital settlement agreement, a   
general waiver of rights to the other spouse’s assets does not necessarily constitute 
a waiver of rights to policy proceeds where the insured neglected to change the 
policy beneficiary prior to death.330  In Smith v. Smith the divorcing couple each 
  
shall impair or waive any cause of action which either party may have against the other for a 
dissolution of the marriage or any defenses either may have to any such cause of action. 
* * * * 
11.  General Provisions. This Agreement is entire and complete and embodies all             
understandings and agreements between the parties.  No oral statement or prior written   
matter outside the Agreement shall have any force or effect. 
Id. at 78. 
 322. Id. at 79. 
 323. Id. 
 324. O’Brien v. Elder, 250 F. 2d 275, 279 n.3 (5th Cir. 1957). 
 325. Id. at 275-78. 
 326. Id. at 278; Davis, 301 So. 2d at 156; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, 242 So. 2d 771, 773 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App.1970) aff’d after remand 277 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
 327. Elder, 250 F. 2d at 278. 
 328. Id. at 280. 
 329. In Elder, the court noted that where the insured policy owner retains the right to change beneficiaries, 
as he had in this case, the beneficiary had only an expectancy interest.  The outcome would have differed if the 
beneficiary was irrevocably designated and could not be changed.  250 F. 2d at 279. 
 330. Smith v. Smith, 919 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
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owned term life insurance on their own lives.331  The marital settlement agreement 
specifically identified each policy, and stated that each spouse would retain as his 
or her own separate property the policies insuring his or her own life.  Each spouse 
waived his or her rights to the other spouse’s assets.332  The agreement was silent 
about the proceeds of life insurance. After the divorce, the former husband        
obtained forms to change the beneficiary of his life insurance but never completed 
them.  On his death his former wife was still named the policy beneficiary.  In a 
dispute between the former wife and the former husband’s estate, the court held the 
former wife entitled to the policy proceeds.333 
The timing of the purchase of the life insurance policy, the proceeds of which 
are claimed by multiple parties, is important.  In yet another case where ownership 
of life insurance was not expressly mentioned in the marital settlement agreement 
or final judgment of dissolution, general, all encompassing releases and waivers 
were set forth.334  The husband owned one life insurance policy on his life at the 
time the marital settlement agreement was entered. After the marriage was        
dissolved, the husband named his second wife the beneficiary of the policy.    
However, after signing the marital settlement agreement, the husband also applied 
for and purchased a second life insurance policy, naming his first spouse the     
beneficiary.335  This new policy was issued to the husband after his marriage to his 
first wife was dissolved, although he applied for it while still married. The        
husband never changed the beneficiary during his life.  On his death both his first 
wife and his estate claimed entitlement to the policy proceeds.  The court held the 
first (former) wife entitled to the policy proceeds.  The wording of the marital   
settlement agreement was not a waiver by the former spouse of proceeds of a life 
 ________________________  
 331. Id. at 527. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 528.  There were two basis justifying the court’s decision. First, in the marital settlement    
agreement the wife did not expressly waive her rights to life insurance policy proceeds. Second, the former   
husband neglected to change the policy beneficiary although he had the right to do so. 
 334. In Raggio v. Richardson, 218 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969), the marital settlement      
agreement, incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution stated, in pertinent part: 
IV.  For and in consideration of the execution and delivery of the conveyance, assignments 
and liens herein after described, each party hereby releases and relinquishes to the other all 
rights or claims of dower, curtesy, inheritance, descent, distribution, and all other rights or 
claims growing out of the marriage relations between them, and each shall be forever barred 
from all rights in the estate of the other party, real, personal or mixed, now owned or        
hereafter acquired, and that the wife does hereby agree to waive any and all alimony or  
support money now and hereafter. 
* * * * *  
X.  That this is a complete settlement of any and all claims of whatever kind or nature now 
and heretofore existing between the parties, on account of their marriage or otherwise, and 
that this agreement is made freely and voluntarily on the part of each of the parties, without 
any compulsion, constraint, apprehension of fear of or from one to the other, and for the 
purpose of making a complete settlement of any and all claims whatsoever of the parties  
hereto, in or against the other, or his or her properties. 
Id. at 501-02. 
 335. Id. at 502. 
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insurance policy which did not exist at the time the marital settlement agreement 
was entered.336 
Courts may be inclined to hold in favor of the beneficiary named in the         
insurance company’s records, rather than to find that a marital settlement      
agreement or final judgment of dissolution, which did not specifically mention the 
insurance policy, altered the beneficiary.337  For a court to hold that the surviving 
former spouse waived rights to the policy proceeds when that former spouse     
remained the named beneficiary, a knowing and intentional waiver must be       
established.338  General release language in a marital settlement agreement will not 
usually be construed as a knowing and intentional waiver or a relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right.339  This is particularly true where the surviving 
spouse was unaware of being named beneficiary of the policy. The same           
conclusion is not always reached where the marital settlement agreement does not 
mention life insurance or the policy, included general language about the intent of 
the parties to finalize their financial matters in the agreement, and included only a 
release by the insured spouse who thereafter died.340  In addition to the wording of 
 ________________________  
 336. Id. at 503-04.  Summary judgment was entered in favor of decedent’s former spouse.  Her position was 
supported by evidence, including a letter from decedent informing her that the insurance proceeds would be  
payable to her at the former husband’s death. 
 337. This is in part due to a recognition by the courts that, to properly conduct their business, insurance 
companies require definitness in ability to ascertain and identify the policy beneficiary.  Spoerr v. Manhattan Nat’l 
Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 128815 (S.D. Fla. 2007).  Another example of the court favoring the beneficiary named by 
the deceased insured, although the beneficiary was the insured’s former spouse, when the marital settlement 
agreement did not mention the insurance policy or include an express waiver of rights to insurance proceeds, is 
found in Davis v. Davis, 301 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1944).  In that case the husband was insured by a 
life insurance policy provided by his employer, and the husband named his wife the policy beneficiary.  Id. at 155.  
The parties thereafter divorced, having entered into a marital settlement agreement providing only:  “The wife 
hereby accepts this Agreement in full satisfaction of all her right of Dower, or right of alimony or other special 
equities in the properties she might otherwise have been entitled to receive.”  Id. at 157 n.9.  This language was 
held not to constitute a waiver by the former wife of the right to receive life insurance proceeds.  Additional  
relevant facts considered by the court were that the insured admitted to his son that he did not change the policy 
beneficiary, but stated he would do so in the future.  Thus, on the insured’s death his former spouse, rather than his 
son, was entitled to the insurance proceeds.  See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1358 
(M.D. Fla. 2003), where the court was called upon to determine entitlement to annuity proceeds as opposed to a 
life insurance policy.  A husband owned an annuity during his marriage.  The marital settlement agreement entered 
in connection with his divorce reserved to him ownership of all annuities titled in his name, without specifically 
identifying any annuity contracts.  The wife was the beneficiary designated on the annuity in question.  Following 
the dissolution of his marriage the husband did not change the beneficiary of one annuity, although he changed the 
beneficiary designated on other annuity contracts.  The husband died, survived by his former wife.  She too was 
deceased by the time the insurance company that issued the annuity learned of the owner’s death.  A contest  
ensued between the estates of the former spouses over entitlement to annuity proceeds remaining at the former 
husband’s death.  The marital settlement agreement was interpreted strictly, so that the former wife’s waiver of 
rights to the former husband’s annuities and other assets was not construed as a waiver of rights to proceeds of the 
annuity.  As the former husband did not actually change the annuity beneficiary, the former wife’s estate was 
entitled to the proceeds.  Summary judgment was awarded in favor of the former wife’s estate. 
 338. Spoerr v. Manhattan Natl. Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 128815 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 339. Id.; Cooper v. Muccitelli, 682 So. 2d 77, 79 (Fla. 1996); Smith, 919 So. 2d at 528. 
 340. In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, 242 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971) the deceased insured 
purchase a life insurance policy on his life while he was married to his first wife.  After their divorce, he changed 
the policy beneficiary to his second wife, and named his sister the contingent beneficiary to take the proceeds if his 
second wife failed to survive him.  Id. at 772.  The insured and his second wife thereafter divorced, but the insured 
never changed the beneficiary designation on the life insurance policy.  A marital settlement agreement was  
entered between the insured and his second wife.  The agreement included two relevant provisions.  First, the 
agreement specified “it is the desire and intention of the parties that their relations with respect to property and 
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the marital settlement agreement, which alone may not constitute a waiver of rights 
to life insurance proceeds by the surviving former spouse, the court may consider 
other facts and circumstances.  These might include the length of the marriage  
between the insured and the named beneficiary, their relationship at and after    
divorce, and whether the surviving spouse knew about the policy.341  These facts 
may enable a court to conclude that the surviving former spouse’s rights in the life 
insurance proceeds were waived.342 
When a question is raised about whether a surviving spouse waived rights to 
life insurance proceeds in a marital settlement agreement which fails to specifically 
address a life insurance policy, basic contract law applies.343 The intent of the   
parties to that marital settlement agreement is to be determined from the entire 
agreement.344  “Further, where there are general and special provisions in the    
contract relating to the same thing, the special provisions will govern its            
construction over matters stated in general terms.”345 
Disputes about entitlement to life insurance or policy proceeds post-divorce 
may also arise when a third person purports to act for the insured or owner of the 
policy.  Attempts by third parties, such as the holder of the policy owner’s durable 
power of attorney, to change a beneficiary designation from a former spouse to 
another may not be successful.346  A durable power of attorney must be carefully 
reviewed to assure that it authorizes that agent to change the beneficiary of life 
insurance, before the agent attempts such a change or the insurance company 
processes it.347 Generally the holder of a Florida resident’s durable power of     
attorney does not have authority to change the beneficiary on a life insurance    
  
financial matters be fixed by this Agreement.”  Id. at 773.  Second, the agreement included a general release by the 
insured in favor of his wife “of and from any claims, demands due, debts, rights or causes of action” except for 
divorce.  Id.  On the insured’s death his first former wife, as court appointed curator of his estate, his surviving 
second former wife and his sister all claimed entitlement to policy proceeds. 
 341. Hoffman v. White, 277 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
 342. Id.  In Hoffman, the court concluded that the short duration of the marriage, the hostility between the 
parties, and the general language of the marital settlement agreement about finalizing financial matters justified a 
court’s conclusion that the insured’s second former wife, named beneficiary of the policy proceeds, was not  
entitled to them.  Instead, the contingent beneficiary named by the insured was to receive the policy proceeds. 
 343. Davis, 301 So. 2d at 157. 
 344. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. White, 242 So. 2d 771, 773 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971). 
 345. Id. 
 346. See Spoerr v. Manhattan Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 128815 (S.D. Fla. 2007).  In that case the wife 
was the owner and insured under a life insurance policy.  She named her spouse as the beneficiary.  The insured 
and her spouse divorced, but she did not personally change the policy beneficiary.  The marital settlement    
agreement did not specifically mention the life insurance policy or distribute it to either spouse.  Nor did the  
marital settlement agreement include an express waiver of rights by the former husband to the insurance.  Instead, 
it stated:  “The Husband further agrees and does hereby release, discharge and exonerate the Wife from any and all 
claims for curtsy, special equity, division of property, inheritance, descent and distribution and/or preferences as 
personal representative.”  Following the dissolution of marriage, the wife executed a durable power of attorney 
authorizing her son to act for her.  The durable power of attorney did not expressly give the son the right to change 
the beneficiary of life insurance policy on his mother’s life.  To the contrary, the document denied the son the 
rights to change any disposition effective at the mother’s death or to transfer assets to a trust created by the mother.  
Despite this provision, the son contacted the insurance company and purported to designate himself, as trustee of 
his mother’s trust, as beneficiary of the policy.  On the insured mother’s death litigation was instituted, as both the 
son and the former husband claimed entitlement to the policy proceeds. 
 347. Id. 
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policy owned by the principal.348  This power may be expressly granted to the 
agent in the durable power of attorney.349 A review of the durable power of       
attorney is required to determine if the power to change the beneficiary of a life 
insurance policy was expressly stated.350  Powers of attorney are strictly construed 
by the court in an attempt to ascertain the principal’s intent.351 
Where parties divorce pursuant to a marital settlement agreement or final 
judgment of dissolution under which one spouse is required to maintain life      
insurance, and the couple thereafter remarries, the effect of the remarriage on the 
life insurance requirement merits consideration.  The answer depends on whether 
the parties have an agreement specifically addressing the life insurance              
requirement, and if not, whether the life insurance provision was executed or    
executory.352  A provision already performed prior to the remarriage is not        
abrogated by the subsequent remarriage of the couple, but a provision which     
remains executory at the time of remarriage is no longer enforceable.353 
 ________________________  
 348. Fla. Stat. § 709.08(7)(b)(5); Spoerr v. Manhattan Nat’l. Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 128815 (S.D. Fla. 
2007); but see Hunter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 131 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961). 
 349. Fla. Stat. § 709.08(7)(b)(5). 
 350. In Liberty Assurance Co. of Boston v. Miller, 2007 WL 423347 (S.D. Fla. 2007), a husband and wife 
were initially married and had a child together.  The couple entered a marital settlement agreement and thereafter 
divorced.  The marital settlement agreement required the former husband to maintain $100,000.00 in life insurance 
on his life, naming either the parties’ minor child or a trust as the beneficiary for so long as this was possible.  
After the divorce was final, the husband became covered by $81,000.00 in group term life insurance provided by 
his employer.  The couple then remarried and their marriage was dissolved for a second time.  The former husband 
then named a friend primary beneficiary of the policy, and designated his minor child secondary or alternate  
beneficiary.  The former husband also eliminated $40,500.00 in policy benefits, leaving only $40,500.00 in   
remaining benefits at his death.  The former husband was ill, and after his second divorce he signed a durable 
power of attorney authorizing his former spouse to act for him in financial matters.  She used the power to change 
the beneficiary of the life insurance policy to the former husband’s estate.  On his death, both his estate and the 
beneficiary the husband previously designated sought policy proceeds.  One question facing the court was whether 
the wording of the durable power of attorney was sufficient to authorize decedent’s former spouse to change the 
beneficiary of the life insurance policy.  The language in the durable power of attorney, which convinced the court 
that decedent’s former wife acted within her express authority, included the following provisions: 
(i)  Under the heading “No Limitation on Attorney–In–Fact’s Powers” the document      
provided the principal “intend[s] to give [his] Attorney-in-Fact the fullest powers possible, 
including all powers set forth in Florida Statute Section 709.08 as now in effect or hereafter 
enacted, and [he] [does] not intend, by the enumeration of [his] Attorney-in-Fact’s powers 
to limit or reduce them in any fashion 
(ii)  Under the heading “Management and Contracting Powers” the agent was expressly 
permitted “to alter, insure, and in any manner deal with any real or personal property     
tangible or intangible and any interest therein” and “to improve, manage and insure           
intangible property that [the principal] owns ‘upon such terms and conditions as the         
Attorney in Fact shall deem proper’ “ 
(iii)  Under the heading “Special” the agent was given “the full power of substitution, in 
other words, the full power to do and perform every act necessary and convenient to be done 
as if [the principal] were still personally present.” 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston v. Miller, 2007 WL 4233547 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Cox v. Cox, 659 
So. 2d 1051, 1053-54 (Fla. 1995). 
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